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This paper tests the deterrent ( or displacement) effects of preventive 
patrol upon criminal and non-criminal disorderly behaviors at high-crime 
locations ("hot spots") using observational data collected during a preventive 
patrol experiment in Minneapolis from December 1988 to November 1989. 
The analyses reveal that the immediate presence of uniformed police directly 
reduces the outbreak of disorderly conduct at hot spots, but this effect is 
contingent upon raising the overall level of proactive presences at hot spots. 
Increasing patrol levels at hot spots also produces residual deterrence which 
decreases disorder during times when police are not present at these 
locations. Such residual decreases in disorder are larger than the direct 
deterrent effects of poJice presence when patrol is at normal levels. Further, 
direct and residual deterrence generated by patrol are stronger for criminal 
acts than for a combined measure of criminal and non•criminal disorderly 
behaviors. 
The analyses employed survival models to estimate the effects of specific 
instances of patrol presence upon the time to the first disorder ( criminal or 
non-criminal) after police depart from a hot spot. Using presences up to 20 
minutes in length, these models reveal that longer presences increase survival 
time, thus enhancing residual deterrence. However, there is evidence this 
effect decreases after presences pass about 14 minutes in duration. Moreover, 
stops must be about 10 minutes in length in order to produce significantly 
better survival times than those produced by driving through a hot spot. The 
theoretical and policy implications of these results are discussed. 
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This paper tests several hypotheses about the deterrent or displacement 
effects of police patrol presence upon disorderly and criminal behavior at high 
crime locations. In doing so, it draws upon theory and research regarding the 
general deterrent effects of police patrol, the debilitating effects of social 
disorder, police responses to social disorder, and strategic targeting of specific 
crime-prone locations ("hot spots"). The observational data used to test the 
hypotheses were collected as part of a one year preventive patrol experiment 
in Minneapolis conducted from December 1988 through November 1989. 
These data provide a unique opportunity to study the interaction between 
visible police presence and disorderly and criminal behavior. The analyses 
test the claims that there is less disorderly and criminal behavior when police 
are present, that increased patrol levels produce residual deterrence which 
decreases disorder and crime when police are not present, and that, with 
regard to specific instances of police presence, stronger dosages create 
residual deterrent effects. The last hypothesis is tested using event history 
analysis. 
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I. POLICE PATROL AND DETERRENCE 
DETERRENCE THEORY AND PATROL 
Deterring criminal conduct through legal threats is a fundamental aspect 
of crime control efforts. Deterrence scholars indicate certainty of punishment 
is generally thought to have greater deterrent value than severity of 
punishment (Andenaes, 1974; Cook, 1980; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). As 
an obvious, visible indicator of sanction threat, police patrol occupies a 
central place in crime control strategies. Yet during the past two decades, 
researchers have questioned the deterrent value of patrol. This paper 
attempts to reveal more insight into the effects of patrol presence upon 
behavior. 
Patrol presence is a visible threat which increases the public's objective 
and subjective certainties of punishment. Zimring and Hawkins (1973), for 
example, discuss the role of law enforcement in making legal threats credible. 
They state credibility is a matter of cues, such as visible police presence, and 
how those cues are interpreted (1973: 171). They further write that direct 
experience and word of mouth knowledge of law enforcement presence and 
actions are factors affecting perceptions of credibility (1973: 163). Likewise, 
Cook (1980: 223-224) states that visible police presence increases certainty of 
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detection and apprehension, and that frequent police presence in an area can 
increase potential offenders' perceptions of risk in that area. In addition, he 
states that even when public perceptions of threat are inaccurate, they may 
still be systematically related to criminal justice activities (1980: 222). If so, 
increases or decreases in the level of police presence should raise or lower, 
respectively, perceptions of threat even though those perceptions may 
overstate or understate the true level of risk. 
The strategy of preventive patrol is to have officers randomly drive or 
walk through an area when not answering calls for service, thereby creating 
uncertainty for would-be offenders. Kelling (1985) states preventive patrol is 
intended to create a feeling of police omnipresence. Thus, potential offenders 
should be deterred even when police are not within visual range because one 
never knows when an officer will appear. 
Notwithstanding these points, Zimring and Hawkins (1973: 171) speculate 
there is a point at which further increases in patrol levels may yield little 
additional benefits. Moreover, they question whether raising the level of 
police presence will, in and of itself, increase deterrence if the increase is not 
enough to actually improve the objective probability of detection (1973: 164). 
Considering that studies of police in Kansas City, Missouri and Lansing, 
Michigan indicate few officers spend their patrol time attentively watching for 
problems, increases in patrol may not necessarily lead to substantial increases 
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in the certainty of punishment (Sherman, 1983: 151). 
On the other hand, Zimring and Hawkins (1973: 168-169) also present 
evidence indicating police visibility can have a deterrent effect on some forms 
of offending even when the objective probability of apprehension declines. 
They report that during a seven month period in 1967 Detroit police only 
issued about half as many traffic tickets as normal with no apparent ill 
effects.1 Using the accident rate as an index for the real number of traffic 
offenses, Zimring and Hawkins found the accident rate actually declined. 
Throughout this period, the number of officers on the roads had not changed. 
This suggests visual cues have an independent role in deterrence. Although 
the actual probability of punishment had decreased, the visual cues of 
enforcement remained unchanged. 
Overall, however, the issue is still unclear. Indeed, Zimring (1978: 164), 
commenting on the general lack of theoretical structure in deterrence studies, 
writes there is no clear relationship between variations in car patrol and 
perceived certainty of punishment. 
BASELINE EFFECTS OF POLICE 
As Cook (1980: 214) points out, debates regarding the deterrent value of 
1Officers took this action as a result of dissatisfaction over working 
conditions and wages. 
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criminal justice policies are centered on the marginal effects of changes in the 
certainty or severity of punishment. Apart from these marginal changes, the 
criminal justice system has a deterrent effect of unknown magnitude. 
Dismantling the system would lead to massive increases in crime, according to 
Cook. Andenaes (1974: 16) concurs, stating, " ... a modern industrial society 
can hardly be kept going without police and penal courts." 
Focusing on the role of police, the "baseline" effect of police presence is 
illustrated by several historical examples. Andenaes (1974) discusses the 
arrest of the entire Danish police force by their German occupiers in 
September 1944 and the tenfold increases in robbery and larceny which 
followed in the city of Copenhagen. Further examples are the massive 
outbreaks of violence and lawlessness which occurred in response to dramatic 
reductions in police manpower during police strikes in Boston (Russell, 1975) 
and a number of English cities (Sellwood, 1978) in 1919. More recently, a 15 
hour police strike in Montreal during 1969 led to riots, arson, gun battles, and 
other disorders, resulting in 3 deaths and more than 1 million pounds in 
damage (Sellwood, 1978: 209-210). 
Hence, it is apparent the existence of police forces has a threshold 
deterrent effect upon behavior, and this effect is tied to the knowledge that 
police are patrolling the streets. Yet, there are also examples of police 
presence failing to deter even serious crime. In Washington, D.C., for 
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example, increasing numbers of police officers and foot patrols have failed to 
bring down homicide rates fueled by drug-related violence. In some cases, 
homicides have taken place within a block of officers and even within visual 
distance of officers (Castaneda, 1990). 
Many researchers and practitioners now question the value of preventive 
patrol, the traditional means by which police have sought to be visibile and 
deter crime. Increasingly, police departments are seeking alternative ways to 
use their personnel. This is due primarily to a number of patrol studies 
which, taken together, suggest only impractically large increases in patrol can 
create significant reductions in crime. 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF PATROL AND DETERRENCE 
Over the last four decades, there have been a number of studies on the 
effectiveness of preventive patrol. The first of these evaluated a project 
called Operation 25 which more than doubled the number of patrolmen in 
one precinct of New York City during a four month period in 1954 (Wilson, 
1983: 62-63).2 Compared to the same time period from the prior year, 
reported crime figures showed reductions in serious crimes, particularly 
outdoor crimes like muggings and auto theft. However, a number of 
2Most of the additional officers were place on foot posts. 
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methodological problems with the study make it difficult to draw inferences 
from the results. For instance, there was no control group, tests for 
displacement were not conducted, and the study did not properly control for 
time trends which may have affected crime levels. 
A similar effort was implemented in the 20th precinct of New York City 
in October 1966 when the number of officers patrolling that precinct was 
increased by 40 percent for an eight month period (Chaiken, 1978; Gallagher, 
1978; Wilson, 1983).3 This study improved upon the Operation 25 evaluation 
by using similar precincts as control groups, examining adjacent precincts for 
displacement effects, and using crime data which spanned from the beginning 
of 1963 to the end of 1967. The evaluation found that different types of 
outdoor crimes showed net reductions. That is, these crimes increased less in 
the project area than in the other areas. Indoor crimes were not significantly 
affected. In addition, there was no strong evidence of displacement to 
adjoining precincts. Nonetheless, the project and control areas were not 
carefully matched on sociodemographic characteristics (Wilson, 1983: 64 ), and 
there were questions about the extent of displacement effects in one of the 
three adjacent precincts which were examined for such effects (Gallagher, 
1978: 178). 
Another saturation patrol study was conducted by Schnelle, Kirchner, 
3The evaluation of this project was carried out by S. J. Press (1971) for 
the New York City Rand Institute. 
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Casey, Uselton, and McNees (1977) in Nashville. Four patrol zones were 
given extra patrol dosage, two during daytime hours and the other two during 
nighttime hours. The researchers reported overall patrol movement was 
raised to 4 times its normal level ( as opposed to only increasing the number 
of officers), and patrol movement under 20 mph was increased to about 30 
times its normal level. Time series analysis showed Part I crimes were 
reduced during the saturation period for those zones having the night patrols 
only. Analysis of crime in the surrounding patrol zones showed no evidence 
of displacement effects. After the saturation period, crime levels in the night 
patrol zones promptly rose to their previous levels. The zones receiving the 
daytime patrols showed no changes during or after the intervention. 
However, the treatment periods were very brief ( each patrol increase lasted 
only 10 to 15 days), and the time series analysis only covered a 4 month 
period. Also, there were no matched control areas. 
Two methodological problems shared by the above studies concern their 
use of officially reported crime (which understates true crime rates) and the 
relatively brief interventions they evaluated. A study which improved on 
these weaknesses examined subway robberies in New York City (Chaiken, 
1978). This study evaluated six years of enhanced subway patrols and 
constitutes the longest evaluation of an increase in police presence. Further, 
it seems likely that crime was reported more accurately in this study because 
8 
reporting was more convenient for victims (they could simply report an 
offense at the next stop) and because many victims were subway employees 
(Wilson, 1983: 65). 
In 1965, special patrols were implemented in the subways from 8 p.m. to 4 
a.m. The number of officers in the subways was increased from 1200 to over 
3100 with the objective of having an officer on every train and at every station 
during these hours. The study evaluated the impact of these patrols by 
examining subway crime, particularly robberies, from 1963 through 1971. 
Both overall crime and robberies decreased temporarily after the patrols 
began, but robberies continued to increase at the same annual rate. After 
two years, overall crime also began to increase at the same rate it had prior 
to the intervention. There was a lasting deterrent effect that continued 
through the end of the evaluation period, however, on nighttime robberies.4 
Thus, the continued increases in robberies were due primarily to increases in 
daytime robberies, leading Chaiken (1978) to conclude there was 
displacement of nighttime robberies to daytime hours. 
Though most of the studies reviewed above suffer from a number of 
4The original evaluation was conducted by Chaiken, Lawless, and 
Stevenson (1974). After the evaluation, there were revelations that transit 
police had manipulated crime figures in order to make the patrols appear 
more successful. After reexamining the data, the authors concluded that a 
deterrent effect still existed though it's magnitude was disorted (Chaiken, 
1978). The findings discussed in the text are the corrected results presented 
by Chaiken (1978). 
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shortcomings, the overall results suggest large increases in police presence 
decrease certain types of crimes. Yet, increases like those described above 
are impractical to implement over large areas. This limits the utility of the 
results. The findings from the subway study are particularly difficult to 
generalize because subways are enclosed areas with few exits (Wilson, 1983: 
66). In the Nashville study, Schnelle and his colleagues did not recommend 
continued use of saturation patrols due to the costs of the patrols and the 
failure of even the night patrol areas to show a residual effect after the 
treatment period. 
The most influential study on the effects of police patrol has been the 
Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, and 
Brown, 1974 ). This project randomly assigned groups of patrol beats matched 
on sociodemographic characteristics to three groups which received varying 
levels of patrol over a one year period. Altogether, fifteen beats were used. 
Five of these beats had no changes in their levels of patrol. Another group of 
five beats was given two to three times the normal level of preventive patrol. 
The final group of beats had no preventive patrol - patrol cars were to enter 
these beats only when responding to calls. The evaluation used reported 
crimes and citizen surveys (administered both before and after the 
experiment) which questioned residents about victimization, fear of crime, and 
attitudes toward the police. At the end of the experiment, the evaluators 
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found no significant differences between the three groups in reported crime, 
victimization rates, citizens' fear levels, or citizens' satisfaction with police. 
The Kansas City study was a breakthrough achievement in criminological 
research, but its results have been questioned. Larson (1975) has questioned 
whether the different beat groups really received different dosage levels. 
Another difficulty is that the small number of beats in the study and the low 
baseline rate of crime within those beats created a statistical bias toward the 
null hypothesis of no difference between groups (Sherman, 1986). 
Nonetheless, the study has been very influential, leading many police 
practitioners and scholars to conclude that preventive patrol has little 
deterrent value. 
Sherman and Weisburd (1988; 1990) have recently reopened the issue 
with a preventive patrol study in Minneapolis which raised patrol levels at 
high crime addresses and intersections. Targeting specific high crime 
locations rather than patrol beats allowed them to use larger sample sizes 
with units having higher baseline rates of crime. This allowed them to 
overcome the statistical problems plaguing the Kansas City study. After a one 
year period, Sherman and Weisburd (1990) found increases in police presence 
led to decreases in crime as measured by 911 calls. This study will be 
discussed in further detail below. 
Some other studies which should be mentioned here are the foot patrol 
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studies in Newark, New Jersey (Police Foundation, 1981; Pate, 1986), Flint, 
Michigan (Trojanowicz et al., 1983; Trojanowicz, 1986), and Boston (Bowers 
and Hirsch, 1987) which attempted to decrease crime, in part, by increasing 
police visibility. The Flint study is the only one of the three which claimed to 
show decreases in crime, but methodological problems with the Flint study, 
such as having no control group and no tests for the statistical significance of 
the crime decreases, cloud the findings.5 The Newark study involved small 
sample sizes, thus biasing the crime analyses toward the null hypothesis of no 
effects (Sherman and Weisburd, 1987; Greene and Taylor, 1988). There is 
also evidence officers were not always walking and performing their functions 
properly (Sherman and Weisburd, 1987: 5), and surveys of residents revealed 
inconsistent findings regarding awareness of foot patrol. This raises questions 
about the visibility (i.e., dosage) of the Newark treatment. Boston's Patrol 
Reallocation Plan, implemented in March 1983, deployed 300 foot officers on 
98 patrol beats throughout Boston (Bowers and Hirsch, 1987). Nevertheless, 
there are questions about dosage in this study as well. The beats varied 
widely in design and staffing, suggesting officers may have been much more 
visible on some beats than on others. Moreover, some of the experimental 
beats received relatively little foot patrol (to illustrate, some had a daily 
5 Also, the foot patrol effort in Flint appeared to place more emphasis on 
community-oriented activities than on patrol visibility. Consequently, the 
crime reductions (if real) may have been due to the content of policing 
implemented by the foot patrol officers. 
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average of only one hour of foot patrol on the day and/or evening shift). 
Overall, the literature suggests the increases in patrol visibility needed to 
decrease crime can only be realistically implemented within small geographic 
areas. Based on the available research, the most effective and practical 
avenue for enhancing the deterrent effects of preventive patrol appears to be 
the location-oriented approach tested by Sherman and Weisburd (1988; 1990). 
At the same time, it is not entirely clear to what extent this approach and 
other saturation approaches displace crime or how long their effects can be 
maintained. 
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II. THE DISORDER PROBLEM 
DISORDER, FEAR, AND CRIME 
The aforementioned studies constitute the bulk of knowledge regarding 
the impact of patrol on crime. Another issue of growing concern is the police 
response to disorderly behavior and conditions. Evidence from studies 
conducted in several cities demonstrates that minor crime and otherwise 
disorderly behavior (such as vagrancy, panhandling, vandalism, public 
drunkenness, drug use, verbal harassment, prostitution, etc.) and physical signs 
of decay and disorder (such as broken windows, graffitti, abandoned houses, 
etc.)6 make people more fearful of crime (Lewis and Maxfield, 1980; Lewis 
and Salem, 1986; Pate, Wycoff, Skogan, and Sherman, 1986; Skogan and 
Maxfield, 1981; Skogan, 1990; Wilson, 1968). Based on survey results in 
Chicago, Lewis and Maxfield (1980) argue that disorder has a greater 
influence on citizens' perceptions than do actual crime rates because citizens 
witness and experience disorder more often than serious crime. Disorderly 
behaviors, in particular, seem to engender fear (Skogan, 1990: 47; Lewis and 
6Skogan (1986: 212) reports that the conceptual distinction between social 
and physical disorder was made by Hunter (1978). 
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Maxfield, 1980: 182).7 Referring to disorderly behaviors (social disorder) as 
"soft crime," Reiss (1985: 8) observes, "It is the visibility, frequency, chronicity, 
and cumulative nature of soft crime that is consequential." This problem has 
been compounded by the decriminalization of many disorderly behaviors and 
the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill (Skogan, 1990: 183). 
In addition to creating fear, some scholars argue disorder contributes to 
more serious crime. In an influential article entitled "Broken Windows," 
Wilson and Kelling (1982) argue that disorder erodes control over a 
community and makes it vulnerable to criminal invasion. Their argument is 
that signs of social and physical disorder make residents and workers fearful. 
As a result, they isolate themselves and avoid contact with others. This 
causes informal social control to break down and raises the level of anonymity 
in a neighborhood. If signs of disorder go unchecked, they become cues for 
potential offenders, indicating a lack of control over the area. Offenders are 
attracted to such unruly, anonymous environments. Disorderly behavior and 
minor violations will then increase, eventually escalating into more serious 
criminal behavior. Wilson and Kelling feel this process has a degenerative 
7 Available evidence suggests disorder can contribute to fear levels which 
are higher than would be expected based on crime rates alone (Skogan, 1986). 
In some cases, the reverse effect can occur. Lewis and Maxfield (1980: 185) 
observe, "The role of objective crime rates is mediated by perceptions of 
neighborhood incivility. If incivility is not perceived to be a problem ... then it 
appears that residents can cope with higher crime rates." 
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effect on neighborhoods.8 Citing research on vandalism as supporting 
evidence of their contagion theory, they conclude a broken window left 
untended will lead to more broken windows. Accordingly, Wilson and Kelling 
recommend that police place more emphasis on helping communities 
maintain order. 
Greene and Taylor (1988) criticize Wilson and Kelling's hypothesized link 
between disorder and crime, stating that research conducted in Baltimore 
suggests the link between disorder and crime is a spurious relationship 
attributable to social class.9 On the other hand, Skogan's (1990) analysis of 
survey data from 40 neighborhoods in Chicago, Houston, San Francisco, 
Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Newark supports the link between disorder and 
crime.10 In 20 of these neighborhoods, residents were asked comparable 
questions about perceived crime problems. Disorder had a strong and 
significant correlation with crime problems even after controlling for poverty, 
81n addition to eroding informal social control and the moral authority of 
a neighborhood, disorder can have a negative impact on the economic vitality 
of a neighborhood by, for instance, driving away residents with greater 
financial resources and making the area unattractive to workers and shoppers 
(Skogan, 1986; 1990). 
9Greene and Taylor (1988: 201-203) also raise criticisms about the 
proposed link between disorder and informal social control. Skogan's (1990) 
research, in contrast, supports the link between disorder and decreasing 
neighborhood control. 







stability, and racial composition.11 In fact, the social and economic factors 
were insignificant when disorder was taken into account. Moreover, using 
robbery victimization data collected in 30 neighborhoods, Skogan creates a 
path model showing that economic and social factors have only indirect links 
to crime through disorder. Thus, he states (1990: 75): 
The evidence suggests that poverty, instability, and the racial 
composition of neighborhoods are strongly linked to area crime, 
but a substantial portion of that linkage is through disorder: 
their link to area crime virtually disappears when disorder is 
brought into the picture. This too is consistent with Wilson and 
KeUing's original proposition, and further evidence that direct 
action against disorder could have substantial payoffs. 
THE POLICE RESPONSE TO DISORDER 
Police of the 1800s and early 1900s assumed more responsibility for 
controlling disorderly behavior than do police today. Describing police forces 
of this period, Moore and Kelling (1983: 53) comment, "The scope of police 
responsibilities remained very broad: they were responsible for discouraging 
lesser forms of public disorder ( e.g., drunkenness, vandalism, obscenities, 
harassment, lewdness), for regulating economic activity (e.g., enforcing traffic 
laws, coping with unlicensed peddlers, inspecting facilities), and for handling 
everyday medical and social emergencies ( e.g., traffic accidents, fires, lost 
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children)."12 Officers made large numbers of arrests for public order 
offenses such as public drunkenness and fighting (Sherman, 1990: 5). 
Reforms of the early twentieth century changed the character of police 
work. Police forces became more professionalized and adopted crime-fighting 
as their primary stated function. Car patrols, instituted to decrease response 
times and improve supervision of officers, isolated police from street life. The 
growth of 911 systems in the 1970s led to even more emphasis on responses 
to emergency calls (Sherman, 1986). Consequently, organizational rewards 
are primarily linked to making arrests for serious crimes and responding to 
emergency calls. 
Furthermore, court decisions and statutory changes have decriminalized 
behaviors like public drunkenness and made it more difficult for police to get 
troublesome persons off the street with charges such as suspicion and 
vagrancy (Skogan, 1990: 87; Skolnick and Bayley, 1986: 139-140). In addition, 
prosecutors and judges usually give low priority to disorder offenses that are 
still prohibited. As a result, police find few incentives in the enforcement of 
12Scholars such as Kelling, Wilson, and Moore feel police forces of this 
time period were more conscious of protecting neighborhoods and serving 
neighborhood needs. Walker (1984) critiques this view of early police work. 
Although police, as agents of local political machines, conducted a number of 
social welfare tasks, Walker (1984: 87) claims there is no evidence police 
consciously sought to fight crime and serve neighborhood needs. Further, he 
states police often lacked political legitimacy in their neighborhoods. 
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disorderly conduct laws and ordinances.13 
As part of the movement toward community oriented policing, however, 
many police departments are attempting to be more responsive to what 
citizens define as community problems. Knowledge acquired from community 
policing projects in cities like Houston (Pate et al., 1986; Skogan and Wycoff, 
1986) and New York (Weisburd and McElroy, 1988) reveals that residents 
want police to address disorder problems. Improved communications with 
citizens and knowledge gained from research have prompted many 
departments to place greater priority on disorder problems. Police 
departments in cities such as Denver, Santa Ana, and Oakland have directed 
special efforts at disorder problems in the central districts of their cities 
(Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Reiss, 1985). A number of studies have evaluated 
programs attempting to reduce crime and fear, in part, by reducing disorder. 
These evaluations provide insight into the benefits of targeting disorder. 
The Police Foundation's fear reduction projects (Pate et al., 1986; Skogan 
and Wycoff, 1986; Skogan, 1990) carried out during the early 1980s in 
Houston and Newark utilized a number of strategies which showed promise in 
reducing disorder, fear, and, in some cases, crime. In Houston, strategies to 
13To illustrate this trend, Skogan (1990: 89) reports that arrests for 
drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and suspicion numbered 2.3 
million and constituted 52% of non-traffic arrests in 1960. By 1985, arreSts 
for these offenses were down to 1.4 million and made up only 16% of no~- . 
traffic arrests. As Skogan observes, this decline seems even more dramatic m 
light of the population growth that occurred during this period. 
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increase police contact and cooperation with citizens and address area 
problems showed different degrees of success in reducing perceptions of 
physical and social disorder and fear. There is also evidence one of the 
strategies reduced property crime victimization (Pate et al., 1986: 29).14 
Officers participating in each of these strategies reported addressing problems 
related to disorder. 
The two fear reduction projects in Newark both involved disorder 
crackdowns, and both showed evidence of reducing perceived disorder and 
crime. One project combined community-oriented tactics like those 
implemented in Houston with a crackdown on street disorder (the crackdown 
measures involved foot patrol, radar and bus checks, roadblocks, and street 
sweeps). This produced significant reductions in perceived social and physical 
disorder as well as fear (Skogan, 1990: 117). Furthermore, the project 
signficantly reduced total Part I crimes, personal crimes, auto theft, and 
outdoor crimes (Pate et al., 1986: 33). The other project combined the same 
disorder crackdown tactics described above (but no community policing 
tactics) with a physical clean-up effort. This produced a significant decrease 
in perceived social disorder and an insignificant reduction in fear (Skogan, 
1990: 117). The program also led to significant reductions in total Part I 
crimes, personal crimes, and burglary (Pate et al., 1986: 32). 
14Official crime data could not be analyzed because the Department had 
made recent changes in its reporting practices. 
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Another police effort targeting disorder was launched in the central 
business district of Oakland in 1984 (Reiss, 1985). This program utilized six 
strategies including foot patrol, increased enforcement of laws and ordinances 
against soft crime, and working with community agencies on problems relating 
to special populations (e.g., homeless and mentally ill persons) who contribute 
to disorder problems. The evaluation, though not intended to be rigorous, 
suggested the program reduced crimes against persons and property. 
Similarly, the previously discussed foot patrol programs in Newark and 
Flint were intended to reduce disorder problems. Based on available 
evidence, it is difficult to say what officers did to reduce disorder and how 
much of it they did. Nonetheless, the Flint study showed crime reductions 
(the problems with these claims were alluded to earlier), and both studies 
indicated citizens felt safer and felt crime had been reduced as a result of the 
foot patrols.15 Esbensen (1987) evaluated a smaller scale foot patrol 
program implemented primarily to deal with disorderly behavior in a business 
district of a medium-sized southeastern city. Public disorder offenses were 
reduced (there was some evidence of displacement), but Index crimes were 
unaffected. 
A six month crackdown on disorder and illegal parking in the Georgetown 
15The Boston foot patrol study (Bowers and Hirsch, 1987) does not discuss 
officers' activities, and citizens were not surveyed for the evaluation. At any 
rate, the foot patrols produced no consistent changes in crime or community 
disturbances. 
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section of Washington, D.C. during 1985 did not produce measureable crime 
decreases, but opportunity samples interviewed in bars and at a major 
intersection revealed high percentages of those interviewed felt the area was 
safer, and a large percentage of those interviewed in the bars felt crime had 
been reduced (Sherman, 1990). Finally, Sampson and Cohen's (1988) analysis 
of robbery rates in 156 American cities found aggressive policing of disorder, 
as measured by arrests for disorderly conduct and driving under the influence, 
had a negative effect on robbery rates. Explaining this, they observe that 
" ... the mechanism hypothesized to account for the results is the impact of 
police activities in changing the perceptions of potential offenders by 
controlling incivilities and disorder" (1988: 185). 
In general, these studies suggest reducing disorder can have beneficial 
effects on crime and fear. At the same time, policing disorder raises a 
number of difficult dilemmas. First, defining disorder is a somewhat 
ambiguous task. Standards may vary from neighborhood to neighborhood, 
and the context within which the behavior happens must also be considered. 
Moreover, there are concerns about forcing the values of certain groups upon 
other groups not sharing those values. On the other hand, there is evidence 
urban residents tend to be in agreement over appropriate standards of 
behavior. Skogan (1990: 54-57) discovered personal characteristics such as 
race, class, and lifestyle explained very little variance in survey respondents' 
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ratings of disorder problems. In addition, there was substantial agreement 
across social groups (owners v. renters, white v. black, and young v. old) 
within neighborhoods. By the same token, Kelling (1987: 95) writes: 
.. .it is deceptive to think that the majority of urban residents 
who are intolerant of street barbarism and support protecting 
neighborhood and traditional values are white, conservative, and 
middle class. Those demanding increased order are people of 
all races wanting to walk streets or ride buses without feeling 
under constant siege by others asserting their 'rights' to say 
anything or behave any way they wish. 
Second, policing disorder creates more opportunities for discriminatory 
treatment, unequal enforcement, and extralegal conduct. Disorder 
enforcement also carries the potential for conflict with personal liberties and 
privacy rights. For example, Skolnick and Bayley (1986: 198-199) question the 
legality of sweeps used in Newark to disperse loitering groups who were not 
acting unlawfully. Further, aggressive crackdowns can spark resentment 
against police. They may also increase fear among citizens by appearing as 
signs that an area is dangerous. This happened in Newark where survey 
respondents who reported awareness of disorder crackdown tactics tended to 
be more fearful and more troubled by social and physical disorder in their 
neighborhoods (Skogan, 1990: 119). 
Finally, many disorderly behaviors are not illegal. For instance, there is 
usually little police can do about drunken or mentally ill street people. And, 
as touched on earlier, there are few organizational incentives for police to 
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make arrests for minor offenses or to take street people to shelters or 
detoxification units (Skogan, 1990). 
Despite these difficulties, it appears police will need to assume an 
increasingly important role in reducing disorder. Many scholars have 
commented on the breakdown of informal social control in modern society 
and the increasing reliance on formal mechanisms of social control. 
Empirical and anecdotal findings show that the communities most unable to 
successfully organize themselves and improve informal social control are 
usually the ones which have the worst crime and disorder problems (Sherman, 
1985; Weisburd and McElroy, 1988). Additionally, informal social control 
may be ineffective with outsiders to an area and disorderly people in non-
residential areas (Skogan, 1990: 169). 
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III. HOTSPOTS AND THE MINNEAPOLIS PREVENTIVE PATROL 
STUDY 
BACKGROUND 
Another line of research having implications for both patrol effectiveness 
and disorder reduction concerns the geographic distribution of crime. 
Routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) states that crime does not 
occur randomly in time and space but, rather, is produced by the convergence 
in time and space of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of 
capable guardians.16 Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger (1989) sought to test 
this theory by studying the geographic distribution of crime in Minneapolis. 
They examined calls for service for a one year period and discovered 3.3% of 
the city's addresses and intersections generated 50.4% of all calls for which 
police cars were dispatched (1989: 37). Sherman et al. label these locations 
"hot spots." The concentration of calls among these hot spots was significantly 
greater than that which would be expected by chance. In addition, they 
examined calls for three predatory offenses which occur in public places 
(robbery, criminal sexual assault, and auto theft) and found these calls were 
even more concentrated than total calls. The predatory crime hot spots 
16Routine activities theory was originally applied to only exploitative 
offenses like robbery and auto theft, but Felson (1987: 912) has since 
expanded the theory to cover mutualistic ~ff~~es (~u~h as prostitution), 
competitive offenses (such as fights), and md1v1duahst1c offenses (such as 
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produced high numbers of both predatory crime calls and total calls. 
An important finding from an operational standpoint is that the hotspots 
tended to be bunched near one another. The data revealed " .. .420 clusters of 
addresses of three or more hard crime calls, totalling 20 such calls, located 
within one-half block of each other" (1989: 43). Further, 72 of these clusters 
were within two blocks of each other. 
The discovery that 3% of a city's addresses and intersections produce 50% 
of the city's calls for service has been replicated in Kansas City (Sherman, 
1992) and Boston (Pierce, Hyatt, Spaar, and Briggs, 1988). Along the same 
lines, Pierce and his colleagues (1988) discovered high levels of short-term 
recurrence for gang-related problems and, to a lesser extent, car accidents at 
certain blockfaces and intersections within Boston. Evidence from other types 
of studies also reveals concentration of crime in specific places. Studying 
crime and fear in four Chicago neighborhoods, for example, Lewis and 
Maxfield (1980) found that certain streets, blocks, and intersections were 
responsible for disproportionate amounts of crime in the neighborhoods and 
that residents accurately perceived these locations as dangerous places. 
These findings suggest hot spots are good foci for crime control efforts. If 
disorder contributes to crime, curbing disorder at these crime-prone locations 
may be a means to reducing the amount of crime they produce. Indeed, hot 
spots are often areas where social disorder can be particularly troublesome. 
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The number one predatory crime hot spot in Minneapolis was an intersection 
with bars, a liquor store, and a park (Sherman et al., 1989: 45). The second 
ranking predatory hot spot was a bus depot. These types of locations attract 
many people and present opportunities for rowdy and otherwise troublesome 
behavior. They also have high levels of anonymity. Surveys show people are 
troubled by disorder in public areas like parks and shopping centers, yet 
informal methods of social control are arguably not as effective in such places 
(Skogan, 1990: 47,169). Therefore, reducing disorder at public area hotspots 
through formal mechanisms (i.e., police) should be less controversial and 
more favorably received, especially by business people and shoppers. 
Considering that these locations appear to possess social and physical features 
which facilitate disorder, displacement of disorder to other places may not 
occur to a great extent. Even if disorder is displaced, it may be displaced to 
areas not as conducive to more serious crime (Sherman and Weisburd, 1988). 
THE MINNEAPOLIS EXPERIMENT: SELECTION AND TREATMENT 
In response to the hot spots findings in Minneapolis, Sherman and 
Weisburd (1988; 1990), in conjunction with the Minneapolis Police 
Department, designed and implemented the Minneapolis Preventive Patrol 
Experiment. The experiment ran from December 1, 1988 to November 30, 
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1989 and examined the effects of preventive patrol at 110 hot spots. A 
detailed description of the research design and procedures is provided in 
Sherman and Weisburd (1988). For operational purposes, a hot spot was 
defined as a cluster of addresses which together produced 20 or more hard 
crime calls (e.g., robbery, rape, burglary) and 20 or more soft crime calls (e.g., 
disturbances, prostitution) over a one year period.17 The selection year was 
from June 1987 to June 1988. The hot spots had to be locations where crime 
occurred in public (public places or places with spillover of activity into 
streets or parking lots) so that police presence could reasonably be expected 
to have a deterrent effect. The researchers chose to exclude the following 
types of places: 
... all residential and most commercial buildings over 4 stories 
(including two hotels), almost all parking garages, department 
stores and indoor malls, public schools, office buildings, 
residential social service institutions (such as homeless shelters), 
hospitals, police stations and fire stations. Parks were also 
excluded because they have their own police. Finally, a few 
known 'magnet phone' locations, at which events occurring 
elsewhere are routinely reported, were excluded (Sherman and 
Weisburd, 1988: 17). 
The boundaries of the hot spots were defined so that the entire location 
could be viewed from an epicenter. Independent field workers visited each 
site and configured the boundaries according to the following general 
17Hot spots were identified using 911 calls. See Sherman et al. (1989) for 
a discussion of the benefits and limitations of using call data as crime 
measures. 
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principles: the hot spots could not be longer than one standard linear street 
block; the hot spots could not extend more than half a block from either side 
of an intersection; and no hot spot could be within one standard linear block 
of another hot spot. 
Finally, the selected hot spots had to show some stability in the number of 
hard and soft crime calls they generated over a two year period. The 
researchers examined calls from June 1986 to June 1987 and June 1987 to 
June 1988. "Clusters with over 150% increases or 75% decreases in hard 
crime calls from one year to the next were excluded from the possible 
sample ... " (Sherman and Weisburd, 1988: 18). 
Rankings among the eligible hot spots were based primarily on hard crime 
calls. For practical reasons, only the top 110 locations were used for the 
study. The high crime addresses within these hot spots produced 20,118 crime 
calls (6,260 hard crime calls and 13,858 soft crime calls) during the selection 
year, averaging 182.9 per cluster with a minimum of 56 and a maximum of 
628. Counting all addresses within the clusters (including those which were 
not high crime addresses), the clusters contained a total of 1,663 addresses 
with an average of 15 addresses per hot spot. These locations produced 
39,015 total calls (crime and noncrime) during the year before the experiment 
began (December 1987 through November 1988) for an average of 355 calls 
per hotspot. This constituted 10.8% of all calls dispatched in Minneapolis 
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during that time period. 
The hot spots were randomly assigned to the treatment or control group, 
and those assigned to the former group received greater dosages of patrol 
over the course of the experiment. Between the hours of 11 a.m. and 3 a.m., 
officers assigned to the experimental locations spent their uncommitted patrol 
time at these locations, thereby providing "intensified but intermittent patrol" 
(Sherman and Weisburd, 1988: 25). Activities conducted at the hot spots, if 
any, were left to the discretion of the officers and their supervisors. Police 
presence at the experimental locations was increased about 13% during the 
experiment ( these hot spots received about 3 times as much patrol presence 
as the control hot spots), resulting in a modest decrease in crime calls at these 
locations (Sherman and Weisburd, 1990).18 
THE DATA: OBSERVATIONS 
The data used in this study are observational data collected during the 
experiment.19 Throughout the course of the project, trained observers were 
18The most reliable data from the experiment extend from the beginning 
of the project to the summer of 1989. These data indicate a relative decrease 
of about 13% in total crime calls at the experimental hot spots. Published 
results from the experiment will be forthcoming from Sherman and Weisburd. 
19The data were provided to the author in their original form by the 
Crime Control Institute, Washington, D.C. Crime Control Institute staff 
assisted the author in constructing new data sets which were used in the 
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sent to the 100 most active hotspots on a random assignment basis to conduct 
70 minute observations between the hours of 6:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
(coinciding largely with the 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. window which generates the 
most calls for service). This was done to verify officers' reports of the time 
they spent at the hot spots and to examine differences in patrol dosage and 
street disorder at experimental and control hot spots. The observations were 
performed during 13 periods, each of which lasted 28 days. This way, 
observations at each location were spread evenly across the year. The 
observations took place Tuesday through Saturday nights, the most active 
nights of the week. They were conducted " .. .in systematic rotating order for 
reasons of administrative convenience, with three nights each week observed: 
Tuesday-Thursday, Wednesday-Friday, Thursday-Saturday, and so on in 
sequence" (Sherman and Weisburd, 1988: 32). 
Twenty-nine observers participated in the data collection.20 Project staff 
recruited these people through newspaper ads and gave them three days of 
training. To enhance the validity and reliability of the observations, training 
exercises required participants to code material from videotapes and written 
scenarios. Further, supervisors made unannounced field visits to verify that 
analysis (the newly constructed data sets are described in the analysis section). 
20Observers worked both full-time and part-time. There was very little 
turnover, but the staff was expanded during t~e ~ourse of the ~roject (the 
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observers were conducting observations when assigned and to double-code 
presences and disorders. 21 
This investigation uses data from 6,273 observations conducted between 
December 1, 1988 and November 30, 1989.22 Thus, the sample has about 63 
observations per hot spot. Including the first and last minutes of each 
observation, the data contain an average of 71 minutes per observation. This 
constitutes an average of 74 observation hours at each hot spot for the whole 
year. 
The observers recorded police presences and disorderly behaviors which 
they witnessed at the hot spots. (Key descriptive statistics regarding 
observations, police presences, and disorders are presented in Appendix A. 
Descriptive statistics pertaining to police presences are taken from the police 
"block" file described in the second section of the analysis chapter.) 
Observers recorded both events within the hot spots and events outside the 
21However, systematic tests (i.e., reliability scales) were not conducted on 
the reliability of the observation instruments. 
22The observers conducted a total of 6,465 observations. However, 192 
(3%) of these observations are excluded from the study due to missing 
information or conflicting data regarding the beginning and ending times of 
police presences, disorders, and/or the observations. These observations 
contained 5% of the total observed disorders and 4% of the observed police 
presences (before combining overlapping presences). 
Examination of these observations across months revealed the proportions 
of excluded observations in December 1988 and January 1989 (the first two 
months of the project) were slightly higher than thos~ of the other months. 
Examination of these cases by time of day and experimental/control group 
status revealed no marked differences. 
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boundaries of the hot spots but within visual distance. When recording police 
presences, the observers counted separate presences as opposed to counting 
numbers of officers. One police squad car represented one police presence 
regardless of how many officers were in the squad. Similarly, observers would 
code a pair of officers walking together as one presence. In addition to 
recording arrival and departure times of police, the observers recorded 
whether the presences were stops or drive-bys.23 Off-duty police working as 
security guards were recorded as police presences if they were working in 
uniform. The observation sample contains information on 24,813 police 
presences which were observed over the course of the year. The vast majority 
of these presences (21,733) were drive-bys. The average length for all police 
presences was 3 minutes, while the average length for stops was 14 
minutes.24 
The observers also recorded several different types of criminal and 
otherwise disorderly behaviors: solicitation, drug transactions, physical 
23If the officers stopped, the observers re_corded any activities the officers 
conducted using categorizations such as traffic law enforcement, foot patrol, 
entering building, verbal citizen contact, and arres~ ~s~e Appendix B). 
Observers also recorded the presence (but not act1v1t1es) of security guards, 
fire department vehicles, and ambulances. 
24Because police presences were not me~ured i~ sec~nds, the length of 
each presence is counted as the number of ~mutes m which t~e pres~nce 
occurs. Thus, a drive-thru from 8:00 to 8:00 1s counted as 1 mmute with 
police presence even though the pr~sence lasted for _less than 60 seconds. 
Lengths of disorders are calculated m the same fash10n. 
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assaults, auto or building break-ins, vandalism, verbal disorders ( e.g., loud 
shouting or verbal harassment of passersby), loud disputes, drunk or drugged 
behavior, loud noise or music, the presence of bag persons, and persons down 
(as if drunk, ill, or injured). An "other" category was created to record other 
types of disorderly conduct (such as urinating in public or flashing) or more 
serious crimes (such as robbery or rape) which were not included on the 
observation sheets. (Descriptions of these behaviors and instructions for 
coding them are included in the codebook in Appendix B.)25 
The data capture 4,014 observed disorders. These disorders include 418 
criminal events (solicitation, drug transactions, physical assaults, auto or 
building break-ins, and vandalism) and 3220 noncriminal events.26 The 
remaining 376 disorders were either unidentified or classified as "other." 
Most of these disorders were relatively brief events, lasting an average of 4 
mins. 
Defining disorder involves a certain degree of subjectivity on the part of 
researchers. Coding particular instances of disorder compounds this problem 
2SObservers were also supposed to record whether a disorder involved one 
person or more than one person; however, they did not record this in many 
instances. 
26If a criminal act and a noncriminal act ~ppear togeth~r as part of the 
same disorder (for instance, an act of vru_id~hsm ~ccompamed by a v~r~al 
disorder), the disorder is counted ~ a cr!mmal disorder only .. ~oncrun~nal 
disorders accompanied by unident1f1ed d1so~ders are not class1f1ed ~s ~nminal 





by introducing an unknown amount of observer bias. In addition, there is no 
available information indicating how users of the hot spots perceived these 
behaviors. Nonetheless, the behaviors recorded by the observers are 
consistent with those cited as problematic behaviors in the disorder literature. 
Skogan (1990), for example, discusses the concern which survey respondents 
in 40 city neighborhoods expressed over problems like public drinking, street 
harassment (verbal and physical), drug use and sales, vandalism, and noisy 
neighbors. He also comments on disturbances created by street people, a 
substantial number of whom may be mentally ill and exhibit bizarre behavior. 
Moreover, his discovery that people tend to agree over definitions of disorder 
lends credibility to efforts to define, observe, and record such behavior. 
Finally, the training and reliability checks discussed previously were done to 
increase consistency and minimize bias in the identification of disorderly 
behaviors. 
These data hold much promise for deterrence research. They capture 
many disorderly events not included in official data and do not suffer from 
reporting effects and potential tampering problems as do official data. 
Furthermore, the data present observed levels of disorder rather than 
perceptions of disorder levels. Police visibility, too, is measured directly 
rather than inferred from other information. More importantly, the data 
allow for the study of threat communication and the reactions of criminal and 
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disorderly persons to environmental cues (i.e., visible police presence), a line 
of deterrence research advocated by Cook (1980: 260). In a sense, they also 
provide a target-specific criminal opportunity study (Cook, 1980: 243). Police 
presence serves as an attribute characterizing criminal and disorder 
opportunities at the hot spots. 
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IV. POLICE PRESENCE, DISORDER, AND DETERRENCE: 
HYPOTHESES AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This study examines the impact of police presences upon disorder both 
during and after the presences. Before examining specific hypotheses, it is 
important to note that the independent variable in this study is police 
presence and not any particular style of policing or set of police activities (in 
contrast to the disorder reduction efforts discussed previously). This is true 
for the experimental hot spots as well as for the control hot spots. Even 
without special measures, there is reason to believe police presence has a 
deterrent effect on social disorder. Reiss (1985: 29-30) discusses the benefits 
of increasing patrol presence in disorder-prone areas: 
Perhaps one of the ways that the police can more effectively 
control soft-crime is by increasing their presence in situations 
where they wish to control the incidence of soft-crime or its 
consequences. By being present, they either increase the risks 
of potential offenders to the point that offending is thwarted or 
their presence increases the probability that those being 
observed can be arrested for some infraction of the law. 
This should be especially true at hot spots. Whether in a squad or on foot, 
officers project greater visibility in the small geographic area of a hot spot. 
Likewise, officers can survey these locations more easily. These factors create 
a more potent police presence. 
However, the presence of an officer may not deter social disorder if it 
does not signal a change in the objective probability of apprehension (Zimring 
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and Hawkins, 1973: 164). In other words, disorderly persons may not feel 
threatened if police tend to ignore many disorderly behaviors. If this is so, 
the presence of police will not decrease disorder unless officers place an 
emphasis on disorder enforcement. 
This issue is especially salient to noncriminal disorderly behaviors and 
behaviors prohibited only by seldom-enforced municipal ordinances. 
Nonetheless, when such conduct occurs in the presence of officers it can 
provoke unwanted encounters with police. Officers may choose to enforce 
applicable ordinances or simply question disorderly persons. Gibbs (1975: 
106-107) argues that some people perceive interrogation by police as a form 
of punishment. Similarly, a Police Foundation study in San Diego (Boydstun, 
1975) claimed that field interrogations decrease certain types of crimes. 
Because over 98% of the field interrogations in the study did not result in 
arrests, the author attributed the crime decreases to the deterrent effect of 
the field interrogation process. Therefore, there is reason to believe such 
encounters with police have punitive value. In the context of this research, 
visual proximity to police may raise subjective assessments of the probability 
of enforcement or field interrogations, thus communicating some level of 
threat and deterring disorderly conduct. 
There are still other reasons why the presence of police might not deter 
some forms of disorderly behavior. Deterrence scholars have commented on 
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the difficulty of deterring violations which involve conflicts over proper 
standards of behavior as well as those that occur in situations where people 
are highly emotional or under the influence of drugs or alcohol (Andenaes, 
1974; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). This certainly applies to many forms of 
social disorder. Also, disorder is more common in poor areas (Skogan, 1990: 
51). Conventional wisdom holds that members of the lower class are less 
susceptible to deterrence because they have less to lose from legal 
punishment (in terms of both formal and informal costs), and they tend to be 
less concerned about future consequences of their behavior (Geerken and 
Gove, 1975: 509; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973: 127-128). 
Nevertheless, Cook's (1980) notion of limited rationality argues that 
people adopt rule-of-thumb principles which guide their decision-making even 
when they are very emotional or inebriated. If this is correct, such principles 
should moderate the behavior of many people, especially when police are 
around and there is more opportunity to get into legal trouble. And, as 
Zimring and Hawkins (1973: 128) observe, legal intervention can make life 
worse for people of all classes. Gibbs (1975: 211-212) points out that 
arguments regarding the non-deterrability of certain types of people and 
offenses are based on intuitive notions, but have little evidential support. 
More recently, Sherman and Smith (In press) have demonstrated that 
deterrability varies among people in poor neighborhoods, at least in regards 
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to sanctions for domestic violence. 
At any rate, it is obvious deterrence operates at a certain level even under 
unfavorable conditions. The question here is whether immediate and/or 
recent visual cues of enforcement (police presences) raise perceptions of the 
certainty of legal intervention and produce marginal increases in deterrence of 
criminal and disorderly acts at troublesome locations where the potential 
benefits of greater deterrence are substantial. 
This study investigates the issue using Sherman's (1990) distinction 
between initial and residual deterrence associated with police crackdowns. 
Sherman (1990: 7) identifies a crackdown as an increase in the certainty or 
severity of official police reactions to specific types of offenses or all offenses 
in a specific area. Initial deterrence is the decrease in offending that occurs 
while a crackdown is in effect. Residual deterrence refers to effects which 
continue after a crackdown has ended. According to Sherman, crackdowns 
create residual deterrence by raising uncertainty about risk. This causes 
potential offenders to overestimate risk levels. Even after a crackdown has 
ended, heightened risk perceptions may take time to decay. Consequently, 
the withdrawal of a crackdown should not lead to an immediate return to pre-
crackdown offending levels. Sherman finds support for this idea in his review 
of police crackdowns. Further support comes from earlier analyses performed 
with the data used in this study (Sherman and Weisburd, 1990). The increase 
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of intermittent, unpredictable police presence in the experimental areas, 
which approximated a crackdown-backoff pattern (Sherman, 1990: 39), 
resulted in 50% less observed disorder at the experimental hot spots relative 
to the control hot spots. Ongoing analyses by Sherman and Weisburd show 
that the proportion of minutes with disorder in the experimental areas was 
100% less than that in the control areas. 
This application treats each observed police presence at a hot spot as 
analogous to an area crackdown. The analysis of initial deterrence, or what 
might be more appropriately called direct deterrence in this context, tests if 
there was less disorder at the hot spots during minutes when police were 
present. This portion of the analysis also makes a general assessment of 
residual deterrence by testing whether the increase in patrol levels at the 
experimental locations produced residual effects which reduced disorder 
during times when police were not present at the hot spots. This concept has 
not been explicitly tested by other patrol studies. Next, the analysis examines 
specific instances of police presence and determines if stronger dosages of 
police presence (as measured by the length of the presences) create residual 
deterrent effects. Testing this issue involves analysis of the time from when 
police leave a hotspot until the next disorder occurs. 
If specific instances of police presence do create residual effects, one 
would expect longer police presences to produce longer follow-up periods 
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without disorder. Longer presences may increase perceptions of police 
concern about the area and raise uncertainty regarding police intentions and 
actions. That is, the longer police remain in the area, the more likely it is 
that people around the hot spot will think the police are "up to something" or 
are on the watch for criminal or disruptive behavior. This should increase 
perceptions of risk. This alone may drive potential trouble-makers from the 
area, creating a more lasting residual effect. Of course, police may also move 
trouble-makers out of the area by direct contact. Friends and associates of 
these people might also learn by word of mouth that the area is or has been 
under police guardianship. If potentially troublesome persons are not driven 
from the hot spot, longer presences may still make them more cautious and 
less disorderly for some length of time. A parallel exists in psychological 
research showing that longer exposure to films of fatal car accidents 
strengthens favorable attitudes toward safe driving practices, though this effect 
disappears over time (Leventhal and Niles, 1965). 
On the other hand, longer police presences may not drive 
criminal/ disorderly persons from the area or make them more cautious. 
Disorder may simply begin or resume as soon as police leave (assuming 
deterrence operates while police are there). Further, the occurrence of 
disorder could be a function of the flow of people through the area. Soon 
after police leave a hot spot, the next potential trouble-maker(s) may enter 
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the area without any knowledge of recent pol' ice presences. 
Yet assuming longer police presences do lengthen residual deterrence, is 
there a point at which longer police presences provide no additional benefits? 
Sherman (1990) theorizes that there is a maximum utility point for crackdown 
length, beyond which there are no additional gains in residual deterrence. 
Such a finding here would imply there is an optimum presence length for 
raising risk perceptions and driving trouble-makers away from a hot spot. 
Once a presence has passed that length, there is little additional benefit from 
. 1 27 Th . . 
staying anger. ere 1s as yet, however, no empirical basis for estimatmg 
where that threshold may lie, if it exists. 
27This discussion does not explicitly consider the benefits of actions police 
might take during long stops (e.g., talking with citizens about problems, 
conducting foot patrols, or confronting suspicious and troublesome persons). 
Since the hot spots experiment did not implement specific styles of police 
activity, this should not pose a major problem. The longer police are at a 
location, however, the more likely it is they will engage in these types of 
activities (regardless of whether the stop is proactive or reactive). In addition 
to any direct results, the perceptual effects of such actions may heighten 
uncertainty and enhance deterrence. On the other hand, troublesome persons 
might not feel threatened if officers appear preoccupied with other matters 
( as when officers are responding to a call). The data do not permi! clear . 
inferences in this regard. This study treats police activities and their potential 
benefits as properties inherent to longer police stops. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
DIRECT DETERRENCE AND GENERAL RESIDUAL DETERRENCE 
Assessment of direct deterrence involves comparing the amount of 
disorder which occurred during minutes having police presence with the 
amount which occurred during minutes with no police presence. If police 
presence directly deters disorder, minutes with police presence should have 
significantly (and substantially) less disorder than non-police minutes. 
However, this task is complicated by a number of factors. There are 
undoubtedly cases in which police presence at a hot spot was in response to 
an observed disorder or something else which was contributing to disorder.28 
This increases the proportion of police minutes overlapping with disorder and 
creates a cause and effect problem. Unfortunately, the data do not allow 
identification of these instances. To lessen the problem, the analysis 
compares the proportions of police and non-police minutes having one or 
more disorder initiations.29 This allows examination of the extent to which 
28Jn the police presence file described in the next section, 7.9% of the 
police stops overlapped with one or more minutes containing an observed 
disorder. The corresponding figure for drive-by presences was only 3.8%. 
29 As an additional check on the cause and effect issue, correlations were 
run between the duration of each presence (using the police presence file 
discussed in the next section) and the rate of disorder initiations per _observed 
minute for the hot spot where each presence occurred. The correlations were 
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police presence prevents the outbreak of new disorders. Of course, this does 
not resolve all ambiguities. If an observed disorder began while police were 
at a hot spot, it is still possible the police presence was in response to a 
problem which was initially hidden from the observer's view.30 
Notwithstanding, these measures are less susceptible to cause and effect 
problems than are comparisons of the proportions of police and non-police 
minutes during which any disorder is occurring. 
The analysis uses a minute-based file which contains a record for each 
observation minute at every hot spot (N =432,719). The file does not include 
the first and last minutes of each observation because it is not clear these 
minutes were always observed in their entirety (nuances in the coding 
schemes also made this necessary).31 Each record contains variables 
run only for presences observed in their entirety, and they were examined 
with and without drive-by presences. These correlations were negligible; the 
strongest was -0.16. Also, correlations between the drive-by indicator variable 
and the disorder initiation rate were very small. This reduces the magnitude 
of the cause and effect problem by showing high disorder hot spots were not 
attracting longer police presences in the overall sample. 
30For example, police might have responded to a barfight and dragged the 
fighting parties outside. If the parties were still behaving in a disorderly 
fashion ( e.g., yelling or fighting with the officers) when the officers brought 
them out, the incident would appear as a disorder which began during police 
presence. 
31If a police presence or a disorder was in progress at the beginning of an 
observation, the observer used the start time of the observation as the 
beginning time of the presence or disorder. In tlhese cases, it is unclear when 
the presence or disorder really began. Also, observers recorded the ending 
time of an observation as the ending time of any police presence which was 
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indicating how many separate police presences occurred during the minute, 
how many of those presences began in the minute, and how many ended in 
the minute. The same information is available for disorders. Altogether, 
53,097 (12%) of the minutes had at least one police presence occurring during 
part or all of the minute and 13,921 (3%) had at least one disorder occurring 
during part or all of the minute. In the figures presented below, however, a 
police minute is defined as a minute which had police presence throughout 
the entire minute. This is necessary because, within a given minute, it is 
impossible to determine if the beginning of a disorder occurs in the presence 
of police unless it can be shown police were there for the entire minute. This 
restriction excludes those minutes in which all police presence(s) began 
and/or ended and leaves a sample of 30,372 police minutes.32 A non-police 
minute, in contrast, is a minute which had no police presence at all. 
Table 1 compares the proportion of police minutes having disorder 
ongoing at the end of an observation. This means that for the first and last 
minutes of an observation, one cannot determine whether police were present 
for the entire minute. These coding rules have implications for the analyses 
below. 
32This stipulation has a substantial effect on the results of these 
comparisons. To illustrate, the proportion of police minutes having disorder 
initiations is 0.00895 when all minutes having any police presence are 
included. This is slightly higher than the proportion of non-police minutes 
having disorder initiations. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ascertain whether 
the disorders in these minutes began before, during, or after the police 
presences. 
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initiations to the proportion of non-police minutes having disorder initiations. 
(Throughout the analysis, disorder refers to total disorders and includes both 
criminal and non-criminal acts. Also, every new disorder counts as a disorder 
initiation regardless of whether there was already another disorder in progress 
during the minute.) Both of these proportions are very small, constituting less 
than 1 % of their respective groups. The figures show the proportion of police 
minutes with disorder initiations is 21 % less than the proportion of non-police 
minutes with disorder initiations, a statistically significant difference.33 
Next, the analysis focuses on only those disorders which were clearly 
criminal acts: solicitation, physical assaults, drug activity, building or auto 
break-ins, and vandalism. These acts are arguably more deterrable than the 
other recorded disorders. They are criminal acts which clearly fall under 
police jurisdiction; certainty of punishment ( or at least certainty of police 
intervention) should be greater for these acts than for the other disorderly 
33For the sake of argument, the proportions of police and non-police 
minutes having any disorder were calculated and compared ( despite the cause 
and effect problem discussed previously). The first run counted any minute 
with any type of police presence (drive-by or stop) as a police minute and any 
minute with any disorder as a disorder minute. The proportion of police 
minutes with disorder was 0.03164 while the corresponding figure for non-
police minutes was 0.03225. Thus, police minutes only had 2% less disorder 
than non-police minutes. However, about 19% of the police/disorder overlap 
minutes involved circumstances which make it impossible to determine 
whether or not the events truly overlapped ( e.g., a drive--by and a disorder 
occurring in the same minute). Therefore, another run was conducted using 
only those minutes in which police were present for the entire minute. The 
proportion of these minutes having disorder was .02812, a figure 13% less 
than that of non-police minutes (p < .001). 
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behaviors. Also, criminal acts such as drug activity and solicitation are less 
likely to result from emotional outbursts and are more likely to be conducted 
in a rational and calculated manner, making them theoretically more 
amenable to deterrence. 
Table 2 provides the figures for crime initiations. The proportions of 
police and non-police minutes with crime initiations are both only a small 
fraction of a percent, but the proportion of police minutes with crime 
initiations is 32% less than that of non-police minutes. This represents a 
statistically significant difference. 
Although police presence directly deters crime initiations, the effect is not 
as large as we might expect. Inspection of these cases revealed the 19 crimes 
beginning during police presence primarily involved solicitation, drug activity, 
and physical assaults (there was also one building break-in). The physical 
assaults which began during police presence may have been the result of 
emotional outbursts which made them more difficult to prevent (there were 
no indications these physical assaults were accompanied by other criminal acts 
such as robbery or sexual assault). In fact, some may have been in response 
to police intervention. The instances of solicitation might also be 
understandable if police tend to be lax on enforcement of this offense. 
Another explanation is that the officers were not immediately visible to the 
offenders. However, an important caveat must be noted. In many instances 
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when police were not present, potential offenders could have noticed the 
presence of observers and viewed them suspiciously. This may have deterred 
criminal activity during times when police were not present. 
Despite this problem, police presence creates a direct and statistically 
significant reduction in crime. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is 
larger than that for overall disorder. This indicates deterrence ( or 
displacement) is in fact stronger for the acts that are theoretically the most 
deterrable (and the most serious). 
Another interesting question concerns the direct effects of police presence 
in the experimental hot spots as compared to the control hot spots. This can 
be illustrated by comparing disorder initiations during police minutes in the 
experimental and control areas to disorder initiations during minutes without 
police in the control areas. In essence, the level of disorder during non-police 
minutes in the control areas represents a baseline level of disorder for times 
when police are not present in areas which have normal patrol levels. Put 
another way, this represents the usual level of disorder at hot spots. 
Referring again to Table 1, police minutes in the control areas had disorder 
initiations 6% less often relative to non-police minutes in the control areas, 
and this difference in not statistically significant. In contrast, the proportion 
of police minutes having disorder initiations in the experimental areas is 34% 
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greater than the difference between police and non-police control minut es, 
and it is highly significant. 
Similar results can be obtained for crime initiations (see Table 2). Police 
minutes in the control areas produced a 17% direct reduction in crime 
initiations relative to non-police minutes in the control areas. This difference 
is not statistically significant, but this may be due to a lack of statistical power 
caused by the low rate of crime initiations and the reduction in sample size 
which occurs when examining only control area police minutes. Nevertheless 
' 
comparison of crime initiations during police minutes in the experimental 
areas and non-police minutes in the control areas reveals a pattern much like 
that found for overall disorder. The proportion of police minutes in the 
experimental areas having crime initiations is 55% less than that of the 
baseline minutes, and this difference does acheive statistical significance. This 
direct effect is over three times higher than the direct deterrent effect 
exhibited by the control area police minutes. 
These analyses of direct deterrence across experimental and control areas 
indicate that direct deterrence was acheived in a much more substantial and 
significant way by police presences in the experimental areas. Further, the 
direct deterrent effects of police presence found in the overall sample appear 
to be due primarily to the direct effects of police presence in the experimental 
areas. This may be attributable to the higher proportion of proactive 
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presences in the experimental locations In other d 1. · · wor s, po ice presences m 
the control areas were more likely to be in response to problems. Under 
these conditions, it seems more likely that police could bring a previously 
unobservable disorder into the observer's view or that some other problem, 
aggravated by police intervention, could create a chain reaction leading to an 
observed disorder. 
A second interpretation is that the experimental presences had a 
reinforcing effect on one another. Such reinforcement could have been 
caused by the greater frequency and duration of police presences at the 
experimental locations. This implies that increasing patrol levels around a hot 
spot enhances the direct deterrent effect of police presence through some 
kind of a cumulative process whereby users of hot spots become more 
sensitive to and aware of police presence. This improves deterrence during 
specific instances when police are at the hot spots. Comparing disorder and 
crime initiations during police and non-police minutes in the control areas 
shows the direct deterrent effects produced by police presence when an area 
has normal patrol levels. Comparing the baseline level minutes (i.e., minutes 
with no police in the control areas) with experimental area police minutes, in 
contrast, demonstrates the amount by which police presence directly reduces 
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An overall assessment of residual deterrence can be made by contrasting 
the amounts of disorder and crime during non-police minutes in the 
experimental and control areas. Relative to minutes with no police presence 
in the control areas, non-police minutes in the experimental areas had 18% 
less overall disorder initiations (see Table 1) and 40% less crime initiations 
(see Table 2). We again find that patrol has greater effects on crime than on 
overall disorder, and both of these difference are statistically significant. 
A possible explanation for these residual effects is that a higher 
percentage of the non-police minutes in the experimental areas were in the 
wake of a police presence. In other words, each instance of police presence 
may be followed by a certain number of minutes during which there is 
residual deterrence created by the presence. Because the experimental areas 
had more police presences, a higher percentage of their non-police minutes 
were minutes in which residual deterrence may have been operating from a 
recent instance of presence. 
Residual deterrence may have also built up through a cumulative process 
like that hypothesized earlier. Indeed, a cumulative effect created by the 
increased frequency and duration of police presences at the experimental 
locat' Id h • d deterrence both during minutes with police 
10ns cou ave improve 
and · • h 
1
- t these locations. For instance, residual 
mmutes wit out po ice a 
d 
· resences might still have been 
eterrence from one or more previous P 
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operating at the time of a new presence. The new presence would benefit 
from the residual effect of the previous presences ( direct deterrence produced 
by the new presence would appear stronger), and the new presence might add 
some reinforcement to the residual effects of the preceding presences. Thus, 
the direct and residual effects of specific instances of presence may have been 
reinforced by previous presences and, at the same time, enhanced the effects 
of later presences. Under this explanation, much of the improvement in 
direct deterrence at the experimental locations could, in fact, be attributed to 
residual deterrence spilling over into police minutes.34 
The results clearly demonstrate that increasing the level of police 
presence in an area enhances deterrence in that area both when police are 
around and when they are not around. In these data, the residual deterrence 
produced by increased patrol levels (in terms of both overall disorder 
initiations and crime initiations) was actually greater than the amount of 
direct deterrence acheived with normal patrol levels These analyses support, 
but do not directly test, the theory that patrol levels affect potential offenders' 
perceptions of risk in an area. Though the demonstration of residual 
deterrence essentially affirms common sense notions, it constitutes a very 
direct, experimentally-controlled demonstration (and perhaps the most 
powerful test to date) of residual deterrence created by police patrol. 
34This interpretation has been suggested by Lawrence Sherman in 





POLICE DOSAGE LEVELS AND RESIDUAL DETERRENCE 
This section explores residual deterrence in a different fashion. 
Specifically, it utilizes continuous time, parametric event history models, 
alternately called survival models or failure time models, (Allison, 1984; 
Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 1980; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980; Lawless, 
1982) to analyze time from police departures to the next observed disorders. 
As stated previously, the objective is to determine if longer police stops create 
residual deterrence in the form of longer survival times without disorder. 
The investigation uses a police instance-based file indicating the beginning 
and ending times of each observed police presence and whether or not the 
presence was a stop or a drive-by (this file initially had 19,498 cases). More 
specifically, the observations correspond to blocks of police time. A "block" of 
police time refers to consecutive minutes with at least one police presence. 
Because the data do not facilitate sequential ordering of presences and 
disorders in time units smaller than one minute, it was necessary to combine 
overlapping and adjacent presences into blocks of police time. In some cases, 
therefore, an observation may represent more than one seperate presence. If, 
for instance, a squad car was present at a hot spot from 8:00 to 8: 10 and a 
second squad stopped at the same hot spot from 8:04 to 8:07, the second 
squad would not appear in the data as a unique presence. Rather, it would 
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appear as part of a non-drive-by presence from 8:00 to 8: 10. Similarly, a 
squad car arriving at 8:00 and leaving at 8:05 followed by another police stop 
from 8:06 to 8: 10 would constitute a block of non-drive-by presence from 8:00 
to 8:10. The same applies to drive-by presences. A drive-by at 8:00 followed 
by a drive-by at 8:01 would appear as two minutes with drive-by presence. 
The event history models presented below use a subsample of the total 
police blocks (hereafter referred to as presences). Presences were excluded if 
they were not observed in their entirety, or if they did not have at least one 
minute of follow-up time after they ended. This mandated the exclusion of 
cases in which police arrived or were already present when the observer 
arrived and cases in which police presences occurred or were still continuing 
when the observer left. 35 Since the research staff randomly determined the 
starting and ending times of the observations, this criterion acted as a random 
variable by which cases were removed, though (as one would expect) this 
affected stops to a much greater extent than drive-by presences. This 
restriction resulted in the removal of 1,298 cases (6.7% of the sample). 
A number of other conditions also determined the sample for the analysis. 
To obtain a better measure of presence duration, presences involving stops 
3Slf police arrived at the same minute th~ observer arrived, the presence 
still had to be excluded because the data defme presences as bl~cks of 
consecutive minutes with police presence. In th~se cases! there 1s no way of 
knowing whether there was any police presence m the mmute before the 
observer arrived. 
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were dropped if, in addition to the stops, the presences were continued by one 
or minutes during which there were only drive-by presences.36 The study 
also does not include presences whose follow-up periods had a disorder and a 
new presence occurring in the same minute since it is impossible to determine 
whether these follow-ups ended with new disorders or new presences. Hence, 
it is unclear whether such a case represents the end of residual deterrence for 
one presence or a lack of direct deterrence for the new presence. In addition, 
presences over 20 minutes in duration were excluded for reasons of statistical 
power which are elaborated below. Together, these requirements resulted in 
the exclusion of 509 cases (this represented 2.8% of the cases remaining at 
that point). 
Finally, presences were removed from the forthcoming survival analysis if 
they had disorder occurring during any minute of the presence (including the 
first and last minutes of the presence). These cases have a high failure rate, 
and many fail quickly. Overall, 67% of the cases having disorder during any 
minute of the presence experience a disorder failure in the first minute after 
police leave. This suggests many of these presences did not have a direct 
deterrent effect. Disorder may have begun or continued despite police 
presence or had a contagion effect causing disorderly conditions to linger 
36For example, a stop from 7:00 to 7:02 followed by a drive-by at 7:03 and 
another stop from 7:04 to 7:10 would appear as a police presence from 7:00 
to 7: 10. Likewise, a stop from 7:30 to 7:35 followed by a drive-by at 7:36 




after the police presence. Either way, it appears cases overlapping with 
disorder have more bearing on direct deterrence and whether police presence 
restored order to a disorderly environment. (Though due to the measurement 
issues mentioned previously, it is not always clear whether or not these 
presences and disorders actually overlapped with one another.) 
Police stops do better in this respect than do drive-bys. Of those 
presences remaining in the sample at this point, there were 68 stops which 
had some overlap with observed disorder. Thirty-four (50%) of these 68 cases 
had observed disorder failures, and 76% of these failures came in the minute 
after the presence. In contrast, 625 of the remaining drive-bys had some 
overlap with observed disorder and 492, or 79%, of these 625 cases had 
disorder failures. Further, 91 % of these failures occurred in the minute after 
the presence. 
Removing these presences decreased the sample by 694 cases (4% of the 
remaining sample at that point). Unfortunately, this also meant losing 526, or 
30%, of the remaining failures. Nevertheless, it appears there was not an 
orderly environment at the time the police left in many of these cases. In 
other cases the situation is ambiguous. It does not seem appropriate to test 
' 
the residual deterrent effects of a police presence if that presence does not 
first demonstrate direct deterrence by maintaining order or restoring order to 
ad. d 1 
· t Removing these cases makes the tests of residual 1sor er y enVIronmen . 
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deterrence less ambiguous and more informative by ensuring the environment 
was orderly at the moment police left. 
This left a final sample of 16,997 presences (87% of the original sample), 
16,050 of which are drive-by presences only. The remaining 947 are stops 
under 20 minutes. The average length of these stops was about 7 minutes. 
(See the descriptive statistics presented in Appendix A.) The follow-up 
period for each presence begins the minute after the presence ends. If a 
disorder was observed before the end of the observation and before the next 
observed police presence, the case has a disorder event ( or, a disorder failure) 
at the time of the disorder. If there was not a disorder failure, the 
observation is censored at the time of the next police presence or the end of 
the observation, whichever comes first. When an observation is censored, the 
event history models take into account the fact that the case survived at least 
to the time of censoring. 
The exclusion of presences greater than 20 minutes is related to this 
point. By definition, longer presences tend to have less potential follow-up 
time. If, for example, an observation ends at 9:10, a drive-by at 8:30 has 40 
minutes of potential follow-up (barring any censoring due to another police 
presence), whereas a 25 minute presence beginning at 8:30 has only 15 
minutes of potential follow-up. This means the drive-by has more at-risk 
time. On the other hand, the rarity of observed disorder ( on average, less 
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than one disorder per 70 minute observation) may actually create a bias 
against finding superior residual deterrence for the longer presence. When 
there is censoring, the estimation procedures for the model can only take into 
account that the observation survived at least to time T without a disorder. 
Because the potential time Tis systematically smaller for longer presences,37 
the models are likely to produce biased estimates ( one way or the other) of 
the survival times of these presences. We return to this issue after presenting 
the estimated models. 
The first step in the analysis is finding an appropriate survival model. A 
key concept in distinguishing amongst these models is the hazard rate. 
Allison (1984: 23) defines the hazard rate as the probability of failure in the 
interval from time T to T + S, given that a case has survived to time T (in 
this case, it is the probability of failure in the interval from minute T to 
minute T + 1, given survival to minute T). Alternatively, Allison states the 
37To illustrate we can look at presences of all lengths (which have not 
been excluded on' other grounds), group them into different length categories, 
and inspect the percentage of cases in each category which have, say, 30 
minutes of follow-up (irrespective of whether a disorder occurred during those 
30 minutes) before the end of the observation or the next presence. Using 10 
minute duration categories up to 30 m_inutes and an open-ended cat_egory for 
stops over 30 minutes reveals substantially less potential follow-up time for 
presences over 20 minutes as compared to presences less than 20 minutes. 
The percentages of cases having a full 30 minut~s of potential follow-up is 
11.4% for drive-by presences, 12.8% for 1-10 mmute stops, 13.9% for 1!-20 
minute stops, 6.8% for 21-30 minute stops, and 0% for sto~s over 30 mmutes. 
(Furthermore the numbers of cases in the last two categories are only 73 and 










hazard can be described as the unobserved rate at which events occur. 
Different parametric models make different assumptions about the baseline 
distribution of the hazard rate, in particular how it changes over time. 
Construction of life tables (Lee, 1980; Teachman, 1983)38 and plots of the 
hazard rate against time suggested a log-normal model is appropriate for the 
data ( these are not shown or discussed in detail since our objective is to 
ascertain the effects of police presences upon survival times).39 The log-
normal model assumes the baseline hazard rises and then falls over time. 
Schmidt and Witte (1988) found the log-normal model (and variations of the 
log-normal) to be superior to a number of other parametric models in 
predicting recidivism among two cohorts of prison releasees from North 
Carolina. In this case, life table estimates of the hazard rate showed that the 
overall sample (which is dominated by drive-by presences) has a hazard rate 
that rises, peaks at about five minutes after a presence, and follows a 
downward trend thereafter. 
38The life table is a non-parametric technique often used as a first step in 
event history analysis. It computes hazard rate values and probabilities of 
survival for specified points in time. The estimates can be computed for the 
overall sample and subgroups within the sample. These estimates can suggest 
what type of parametric distribution (if any) best suits the data. 
391n the original sample, this pattern was visible after stratifying presences 
according to whether they overlapped with any observed disorder. 
Subsequent hazard plots were constructed both for the final group of selected 
cases and for all cases which had an observed follow-up period, no ties 
between the next presence and the next disorder, and no disorder overlap. 
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These plots also revealed the hazard becomes erratic beginning in the 30-
40 minute range. Relatively few cases were observed out to the 30-70 minute 
range without disorder or censoring (this is especially true for stops over 10 
minutes). Consequently, the hazard becomes unstable (particularly within the 
40-70 minute range), fluctuating substantially as a result of small numbers of 
events. For stops overall, single events create dramatic jumps in the hazard at 
the outer time ranges. Of course, the dissipation, or decay, of residual 
deterrence may contribute to this fluctuation. There is currently no basis for 
estimating how long residual deterrence lasts after a presence. Unfortunately, 
inadequate sample sizes in the stop category (and within subgroups of the 
stop category) make it difficult to test hypotheses about residual deterrence at 
the 30-70 minute range. Owing to these problems, the models presented 
below use a maximum 30 minute follow-up period for each presence. Cases 
not experiencing an event or censoring prior to 30 minutes are, thus, censored 
at 30 minutes. Overall, 1210 cases, or 7% of the remaining sample, had 
disorder failures within 30 minutes. Life table estimates of the survival 
function indicated the probability of surviving to 30 minutes was 0.85. 
The log-normal model is an accelerated failure time event history model 
which is expressed in terms of the natural logarithms of the survival times: 
logT = a + b1x1 + b2x2 + ... + bnXn + cu 
where T is the survival time, x1 through xn are covariates, and cu is a normally 
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distributed error term (Allison, 1984; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980)_40 
When using censored data, the model estimates the parameters using 
maximum likelihood procedures rather than ordinary least squares. 
Referring to Table 3, model 1 shows the effect of drive-by presences 
relative to all stops and the effect of increasing duration for stops ( duration is 
set to zero for drive-by presences). Relative to all stops, drive-by presences 
actually have significantly longer log survival times. This is probably because, 
even after removing presences overlapping with visible disorder, many of the 
stops are responses to problems and take place during times that have higher 
risk for disorder. Overall, we would expect stops to be a more heterogenous 
group than drive-bys. It is also possible that troublesome persons feel more 
secure after a police stop because they think police are unlikely to return any 
time soon. However, the duration variable shows that each extra minute of 
police presence has a significant and positive effect as well. 
The coefficients of model 1 show the additive effects of the covariates 
upon the log of survival time. By performing a simple transformation upon 
these coefficients, we can ascertain the impact of the covariates upon survival 
time itself. These effects are multiplicative rather than additive. (When the 
log-normal model is expressed in terms of survival time, it becomes a 
multiplicative model showing the multiplicative effects which the covariates 
4°'fhe log-normal model assumes the Jog survival times are normally 
distributed (Lawless, 1982: 220). 
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have upon survival time.) Specifically, we can exponentiate the coefficients in 
model 1 to see the multiplicative effects of the covariates on survival time. 
Thus, the drive-by indicator multiplies the mean survival time by e·811 = 2.25. 
This indicates that survival times are, on average, 2.25 times longer for drive-
bys than for stops. Put another way, the survival times of drive-bys are 125% 
greater than those of all stops as a group (this percentage change is calculated 
by subtracting 1 from the multiplicative effect and multiplying the difference 
by 100). For stops, each extra minute of duration multiplies survival time by 
e·204 = 1.23, thereby increasing it 23%. 
Model 1 also has a variable for duration-squared in order to test for non-
linear effects (i.e., a plateau effect). This variable is not statistically 
significant, but its negative sign suggests that the benefits of stop duration 
peak before 20 minutes. We can calculate an estimate of the plateau point by 
taking the coefficient for duration and dividing it by -2 times the coefficient 
for duration-squared. This places the plateau point somewhere between 14 
and 15 minutes. Figure 1 displays this graphically. Duration increases the log 
of survival time until duration reaches about 14 minutes. (The total effects 
on the log of survival time presented on the y axis of Figure 1 are calculated 
by multiplying each duration value by .204 and adding this to the product of 
duration-squared and __ 007.) Stops appear to be most effective when they are 
13 15 • 
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a downturn, though this downturn is not statistically significant. 
Both the positive effect of the drive-by category and the possible existence 
of a maximum utility point for presence length raise two additional questions. 
First, is there is a threshold point which stops must pass before they create 
greater residual deterrence than drive-by presences? Second, if there is a 
point at which stops become superior to drive-bys, is there also a point at 
which stops cease to be more effective than drive-bys? Drive-bys create a 
.811 increase in the log of survival time, and Figure 1 shows that stops 
produce a .8 increase in the log of survival time once they reach about 5 
minutes in duration. After stops pass 5 minutes in duration, their effects are 
always greater than .8. Nonetheless, this does not tell us whether any of these 
stops are significantly better than drive-bys in terms of residual deterrence. 
Model 2 (see Table 3) attempts to address these questions more explicitly. 
Model 2 breaks presences down into four categories: drive-bys, 1 to 5 minute 
stops, 6 to 10 minute stops, 11 to 15 minute stops, and 16 to 20 minute 
stops.41 The model uses drive-bys as the reference category and tests if the 
other categories have significantly different effects than the reference group. 
Relative to drive-by presences, 1 to 5 minute stops have significantly worse 
survival times, but 11-lS minute presences have significantly better survival 
41Th f f ' , t ·ntervals is an arbitrary decision, but it seems 
e use o 1ve mmu e 1 • 
useful d , ff bl The groupings are small eno?gh to capture mea_mngful 
an JUS 1 ta e. . . oint of the duration response curve m 
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times. The latter presences increase survival time by 388% relative to drive-
bys. The other categories have positive but insignificant effects. 
Further, the sizes of the coefficients change in the way one would expect 
based on the results of model 1. As the lengths of the presences become 
longer, the sizes of the coefficients increase up to a point, after which there is 
a drop-off. Stops begin to show residual effects superior to those of drive-bys 
after stops reach about five minutes in length. If a stop is more than 10 
minutes, it creates residual effects which represent a very large and 
statistically significant improvement over the residual deterrence generated by 
driving through a hot spot. For stops beyond 15 minutes, residual effects 
decrease and are not significantly better than those generated by drive-bys. 
However, the small sample size in the 16-20 minute category should make 
one cautious about drawing strong inferences for that group. 
Though the coefficients in these models show that stops of certain lengths 
are superior to drive-bys, they do not make it entirely clear how much extra 
residual deterrence these stops generate in terms of minutes. To better 
illustrate what some of these coefficients mean in terms of real survival times, 
log-normal survival estimates were computed for follow-up periods of up to 30 
minutes for drive-bys and 11-15 minute stops. These estimates form survival 
curves which are presented in Figure 2. These curves show the probability of 











Table 4 also shows the probability of survival to selected time points for 
drive-bys and 11-15 minute stops.42 
To illustrate, the probability of having 30 minutes of order following a 
drive-by is .84. For 11-15 minute stops, this probability is .96. Thus, a sample 
of 100 drive-bys with 30 minute follow-up periods would be expected to have 
16 disorder failures. In contrast, a sample of 100 11-15 minute stops with 30 
minute follow-up periods would be expected to have 4 disorder failures. 
However, these figures may underestimate the true difference in residual 
deterrence generated by the two categories. Both Table 4 and Figure 2 show 
that the difference in survival times between the groups gets larger over time. 
If the follow-up periods were longer, the residual benefits of 11-15 minute 
stops would likely appear even greater. 
Taken together, the survival models suggest there is a threshold point for 
the duration of police stops and a possible maximum utility point for stop 
duration. Using 5 minute duration groupings, it appears stops must last 
beyond 10 minutes in order to generate significantly more residual deterrence 
than do drive-by presences. Models 1 and 2 both identify a maximum utility 
point for duration somewhere in the 11 to 15 minute range. The results are 
42These estimates equal 1 minus the value of the cumulative normal 
distribution evaluated at (logT - z)/c where Tis the chosen follow-up time, z 
represents the difference between the two categories (drive-bys and 11-15 
minute stops), and c is the scale term shown in model 2 of Table 3 (Lawless, 
1982: 24). Referring to model 2, m is 5.490 (the constant term) for drive-bys 
and (5.490 + 1.584) for 11-15 minute stops. 
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not as clear for stops over 15 minutes, but both models suggest the benefits of 
longer duration decline after 15 minutes.43 While interpreting these results, 
we must also keep in mind that they demonstrate the effects of police dosage 
levels conditional upon there having been no observable disorder during the 
presence or at the end of the presence (i.e., conditional on an orderly 
environment).44 
43These results persisted in more complicated versions of the models 
which included variables for warm/cold weather months (with May through 
September coded as warm months), hour of day, and hour of day squared. 
The warm months had highly significant negative effects on survival time in 
each model, while the hour of day variables were marginally significant in 
each run. Nevertheless, introduction of these variables produced almost no 
changes in the effects of the police variables. The slight changes which did 
occur were more in favor of stops: drive-bys became only marginally 
significant (p = .06) in model 1 and the negative effect of 1 to 5 minute stops 
in model 3 became only marginally significant (p = .07). Because these 
variables had very little impact on the police variables, they are not included 
with the presented models. 
~e models were also estimated after including those presences which 
had disorder during one or more minutes of the presence. A dummy variable 
was used to indicate whether or not there was disorder during the presence. 
This variable had a very strong and highly significant negative effect on 
survival time in both models. Otherwise, the results were similar to the 
results presented in the text. The drive-by and duration variables were both 
significant in model 1, though the drive-by indicator did not have as large an 
effect. Duration-squared was again negative and insignificant, suggesting a 
possible plateau point around 18 minutes. 
Model 2 showed more substantial changes, but the basic pattern of the 
results remained the same. The coefficients of the duration categories 
increased, peaked at the 11-15 minute category (which generated a 265% 
increase in survival time relative to drive-bys), and decreased for the final 
category. However, the negative effect of the 1-5 minute category lost its 
significance. Further, the 6-10 minute category produced a statistically 
significant (p = .05) 53% increase in survival time relative to drive-bys, while 
the 16-20 minute category produced a marginally significant (p = .08) 104% 
67 
A limitation of these models is that they take an ahistorical view of each 
presence and its aftermath. That is, previous events (presences and disorders) 
both within each 70 minute observation window and over the course of the 
entire year could affect each presence and its associated survival time. yet, 
the randomly selected starting times and relatively short lengths of the 
observations make it difficult to reconstruct even the most immediate history 
of the location. Moreover, there is no theoretical basis upon which to decide 
how far back in time such measures should go. Considering the flow of 
acti~ity and people into and out of hot spots (Sherman et al., 1989), very 
recent history (i.e., the last hour) may matter very little. Besides, examining 
the last few minutes before a presence is likely to be an incomplete 
consideration of prior history. The most important effects of different levels 
of police presence may come from patterns developing over several hours, 
days, months, or years. Capturing these effects would require longitudinal 
study of the "criminal careers" of the hot spots. In an attempt to test for any 
cumulative effects from the experiment, a dummy variable indicating whether 
the hot spot was an experimental or control hot spot was entered into the 
above models. The variable did not have a significant impact and was 
ommitted from the models (including this variable also had no substantial 
increase in survival time relative to drive-bys. Thus, the imp~ct ~f stops may 
be somewhat stronger when the environment of the hot spot 1s d~sorde~ly. 
This suggests the findings presented in the text may be conservative estimates 
of the effects of police dosage. 
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impact on the effects of the police variables).45 More complicated efforts to 
model historical factors is beyond the scope of this investigation. 
Nonetheless, the ability of the models to capture duration effects despite this 
problem is impressive. 
A related issue is that the models do not have variables representing 
individual characteristics of the hot spots.46 This problem should be 
minimized, however, by the selection process by which the locations were 
chosen. As discussed previously, all of the locations had to generate 
minimum numbers of hard and soft crime calls within a one year period, show 
reasonable stability in hard crime calls over a two year period, and be public 
locations or locations with spillover of activity into public space. 
To test the robustness of the results and the appropriateness of the log-
normal distribution, the same models were estimated using different 
parametric and semi-parametric models. Some of the most commonly used 
parametric distributions are the exponential and Weibull distributions. 
Exponential models assume a constant hazard rate while Weibull models 
451n spite of more frequent presences in the experimental locations, the 
average potential follow-up time for presences in the experimental areas was 
only 1 minute less than that for control area presences. It seems unlikely, 
therefore, that the insignificance of the experimental/control variable is due 
to systematically shorter censoring times for presences in the experimental 
areas. 
46Call data for the hot spots are not included in the observational data 
and were not available to the author. 
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assume the hazard rate either decreases or increases monotonically over time. 
In other words, Weibull models assume a hazard that either increases or 
decreases at a constant rate; it does not change direction. 
The exponential model is a special case of the Weibull model. Basically, 
it is a Weibull model with a restriction that the hazard rate be constant. This 
restriction can be formally tested using log likelihood ratio tests. These tests 
(not shown) indicated the restriction was reasonable for each model. Th us, 
the Weibull distribution was inappropriate for the data. 
The exponential model can be expressed as an accelerated failure time 
model using the same equation as that presented for the log-normal model. 
The only difference is that the exponential model assumes the error term 
follows an exponential distribution rather than a normal distribution. Table 5 
shows that estimating the models with an exponential distribution produced 
results which are essentially the same as those obtained with the log-normal 
distribution in terms of directions, statistical inferences, and magnitudes of 
effects. Though the exponential and log-normal models cannot be formally 
tested against one another, inspection of the log likelihoods produced by each 
model provides an informal assessment of which model has a better fit to the 
data (Schmidt and Witte, 1988). The log-normal models produced log 
likelihoods that were 50 to 55 points better ( closer to 0) in each instance. 
Finally, the results were tested using the general proportional hazards 
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model developed by Cox (1972). This model, often referred to as a semi-
parametric model, makes no assumptions about the distribution of the 
baseline hazard. In essence, it estimates the impact of the covariates upon 
the hazard rate without presenting an estimate of the baseline hazard rate. 
The Cox models are not presented here because they use a different equation 
than the accelerated failure time models. Therefore, the coefficients of the 
Cox models and the accelerated failure time models are not equivalent 
without use of a transformation procedure. Suffice it to say the Cox model 
concurred with the log-normal and exponential results in terms of directions 
of effects and statistical inferences. 
The discovery of a log-normal distribution for this application is itself 
interesting and worthy of discussion. As stated previously, the hazard plots 
revealed the likelihood of a new disorder is greatest about five minutes 
following a presence (though even at this point the life table estimate of the 
hazard was only about 0.01). A possible interpretation is that the occurrence 
of disorder following a police presence is more a function of people 
remaining around the hot spots than it is a function of the flow of people into 
and out of the hot spots. If police do not drive troublesome persons away 
from a hot spot, those persons are most likely to engage in ( or resume) some 
kind of disorderly activity a few minutes after police leave. During those first 
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to arrive again very soon. The hazard rate may take a few minutes to peak 
because police presence makes people temporarily more cautious (as 
hypothesized earlier) if they remain at the hot spots. The log-normal survival 
models indicate that, up to a certain point, stronger dosages of presence 
decelerate the time to failure, pushing back the peak time for disorder 
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980: 34). Longer presences most likely accomplish 
this by both driving away troublesome persons and creating a longer 
cautionary period among those who are still around. 
Before concluding the survival analysis, it seems desirable to attempt to 
provide some further indication as to whether the effects of duration have a 
real plateau at 15 minutes and whether police presences over 20 minutes 
improve residual deterrence. Although the data have built-in problems which 
make it difficult to assess the impact of presences over 20 minutes, an 
informal examination may be helpful. Table 6 uses stops of up to 30 minutes, 
breaks them into 10 minute categories, and presents the percentage failing 
within a designated time, x, given that the cases had x minutes of follow-up 
without censoring. For example, the top row presents the percentage of cases 
in each category failing within the first ten minutes of follow-up given the 
cases had at least ten minutes before the occurrence of new police presences 
or the end of their respective observations. The next rows repeat this 
procedure for 20 and 30 minute follow-ups, though the number of cases in the 
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21-30 minute presence category becomes very small (beyond 30 minute 
presences, the number of cases with even 10 minutes of uncensored follow-up 
is too smalJ to be useful). This table suggests that with a minimum ten 
minute follow-up period, the 21-30 minute presences do well. After this, the 
number of cases followed for 20 and 30 minutes is too smaJJ to really be 
useful. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to draw any firm conclusions 
about presences over 20 minutes. Based on the available data, it appears 
that, within a 20 minute duration range, the maximum utility point for 
presence duration is between 14 and 15 minutes. 
As a final note, survival analyses were conducted only for overall 
disorders. Though it was desired to run the models for criminal events only, 
the number of cases with criminal failures is so small (around 1% of the 
cases) it would be very difficult to find any significant effects (Allison, 1984: 
50). 
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has yielded a number of insights into the deterrent effects of 
police patrol. Specifically, the observational data demonstrate both direct and 
residual deterrence from patrol. Analysis of direct deterrence showed 
immediately visible police presence in a small geographic area has a direct 
deterrent effect on the outbreak of both disorderly and criminal conduct in 
that area. However, direct deterrence was primarily generated by presences 
in the experimental hot spots. This effect may have been due to a lower 
proportion of reactive presences among this group, a cumulative process 
whereby proactive presences had a reinforcing effect on one another, or a 
combination of the two. At any rate, it appears proactive police presence at a 
hot spot raises perceptions of risk and perceptions of the certainty of 
punishment or legal intervention for criminal and disorderly persons. 
Moreover, this effect is greater on criminal acts. Compared to the other 
behaviors recorded by the observers, these acts carry greater certainty and 
severity of punishment. The behaviors which are the most deterrable in 
theory turned out to be the most deterrable in these data. 
The investigation also clearly demonstrated that enhancing patrol levels in 
smaJI areas creates residual deterrence that decreases crime and disorder by 
substantial amounts during times when police are not visibly present. This 
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concept has not been explicitly tested by other patrol studies. Indeed, the 
increases in patrol levels at the experimental locations produced residual 
reductions in measures of both crime and overall disorder that were greater 
than the direct reductions acheived during specific instances when police were 
present in the control areas. The findings of residual deterrence raise the 
possiblity that residual deterrence produced by proactive presences in the 
experimental areas spilled over into experimental police minutes, making 
direct deterrence appear greater for these presences. The data are consistent 
with, although they do not measure, the hypothesis that enhanced patrol levels 
changed offenders' perceptions about the experimental hot spots by making 
these hot spots seem less hospitable to disorderly and criminal conduct. This 
finding thus fails to falsify a fundamental claim made by many deterrence 
scholars. 
Investigation of residual effects associated with specific instances of police 
presence showed stronger dosages, as measured by the durations of the police 
presences, improved residual deterrence. Each extra minute of presence at a 
hot spot created a statistically significant increase in the time until the next 
occurrence of crime or disorder ( criminal acts could not be examined 
separately for this portion of the analysis). Yet, these results also suggest 
there is a threshold point which dosage must reach before it generates 
significantly more residual deterrence than that generated by simply driving 
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through a hot spot. Analysis with survival models suggests this threshold is 
reached at about 10 minutes. When police stop at a hot spot for over 10 
minutes, they create a large and statistically significant increase in the time 
until the first disorder after they depart. The data also show that, within a 20 
minute dosage range, the benefits of dosage peak at 14-15 minutes and 
decrease thereafter. However, limitations of the data and the insignificance 
of the non-linear effect in model 1 should temper conclusions regarding this 
leveling off point. 
The findings imply that longer presences, at least up to a point, heighten 
uncertainty and raise perceptions of risk at hot spots. This lengthens survival 
times, probably through a combination of driving some troublesome persons 
away and making others more cautious for some time afterwards. In fact, the 
implementation of longer stops at the experimental hot spots may have been 
a primary mechanism by which crime and other disorderly behaviors were 
reduced in those hot spots. Taken together, the results of the minute-based 
and survival analyses suggest police can maximize their deterrent effect at hot 
spots by implementing proactive, medium-length stops at these locations on a 
random, intermittent basis. This way, police can maximize residual 
deterrence and perhaps minimize the amount of unnecessary time they spend 






An important finding implicit within the aforementioned results is that 
preventive patrol decreases non-criminal disorder. Despite the difficulties 
inherent in deterring these behaviors (i.e., value conflicts, emotional contexts, 
and lack of criminal penalties), higher patrol levels and longer presences both 
exhibit a restraining effect. This study also provides further evidence of the 
link between disorder and crime. These results and those of Sherman and 
Weisburd (1990) reveal patrol reduced both crime and non-criminal disorder. 
Although these studies cannot conclusively demonstrate that reduction of non-
criminal disorder is a causal mechanism for crime reduction, the studies do 
provide clear indications these phenomena are intertwined. At a minimum, 
we can say they are responsive to the same preventive measures (i.e., police 
presence in cars and/or uniform). This could be interpreted as additional 
support for Wilson and Kelling's (1982) incivilities thesis, though not at the 
neighborhood level. 
A number of policy implications emerge from these results as well. This 
study reinforces Sherman and Weisburd's (1990) contention that preventive 
patrol, if properly focused, has a deterrent (or at least a displacement) effect 
on crime. More specifically, it provides further justification for proactively 
concentrating more patrol resources on specific troublesome locations. 
Though this would entail more emphasis on locations as opposed to 
neighborhoods, there is empirical and anecdotal evidence justifying such an 
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approach. Commenting on the substantial variation of predatory crime within 
communities as well as across communities, Sherman et al. (1989: 43) state, 
" ... the general safety of places in the city's 'dangerous' neighborhoods further 
suggests the theoretical and policy significance of the criminology of place as 
distinct from the traditional criminology of neighborhoods or areas." Pierce et 
al. (1988) recommend directing proactive enforcement against recurring, 
predictable problems at troublesome locations. Similarly, Weisburd and 
McElroy (1988: 92,95) report foot-based, community patrol officers operating 
in one of New York City's precincts often focus their efforts on crime and 
disorder problems at particular locations or blocks within their beats. Finally, 
Taylor and Gottfredson (1986) review evidence concerning physical 
environment and crime prevention and conclude crime prevention efforts 
should focus on particular street blocks rather than neighborhoods. 
The basic relationships demonstrated by these analyses indicate police 
departments can productively increase patrol levels around hot spots and 
implement random proactive stops at these locations. It appears such stops 
should last between ten and fifteen minutes in order to maximize their 
effectiveness. Police departments could conceivably target many hot spots at 
once by assigning patrol officers to a number of hot spots and having officers 
make regular stops at each of their assigned spots. 
Still, there are a number of questions remaining about hot spot patrol 
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interventions. Most obviously, this study has not addressed what officers do 
while at hot spots. These results have provided a basis for proactive presence 
at such locations. A logical next step (besides that of further investigating the 
maximum utility point for stop duration) would be to experiment with 
different styles of policing at hot spots. Departments might have officers 
conduct short walking tours of hot spots or engage in problem oriented 
policing (Eck and Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1979; Sherman, 1986) at hot 
spots. Giving officers substantial autonomy in their handling of hot spots 
might well enhance their job satisfaction and enthusiasm for policing hot 
spots. 
Departments could also set higher priority on disorder enforcement at 
these locations. If, on the other hand, preventive patrol can deter disorder 
without resort to aggressive tactics (as this study has suggested), police may 
choose to adopt a posture that is not overly aggressive. Although this study 
has shown that preventive patrol can prevent disorder, it does not address 
how officers should best handle disorder (particularly non-criminal disorder) 
that does occur when they are present. 
Another question concerns displacement. The data do not permit 
assessment of displacement effects.47 Nevertheless, hot spots seem to have 
social and physical characteristics facilitating crime and disorder. As stated 
47Preliminary results offered by Sherman and Weisburd (1990) have not 
yet examined the displacement hypothesis. 
79 
earlier, any displacement that does occur may displace disorder to areas not 
as conducive to such conduct. Besides, departments could monitor this on an 
ongoing basis. A department could shift targets if and when it discovered 
indications of crime and disorder displacement. 
Further experimentation is needed to determine whether location-oriented 
patrols would be successful in other cities with warmer climates and greater 
crime problems than those of Minneapolis. In addition, future studies may be 
able to show how often officers should stop at hot spots. The major 
implication of this study is that increased patrol levels and stronger dosages of 
presence can reduce crime and otherwise disturbing behavior at a city's most 
troublesome locations, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of preventive 
patrol. 
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Table 1. Minute-Based Disorder Initiation Comparisons: Proportions of 
Minutes With Disorder Initiations 
Group 1 Minutes 
Non-police (all) 
3304/379622 = .00870 
Non-police (ctrl) 
1891/199034 = .00950 
Non-police (ctrl) 
1891/199034 = .00950 
Non-police ( ctrl) 
1891/199034 = .00950 
* * * significant at p < = .001 
Relative 
Group 2 Minutes Difference Z score8 
Police (all) -21% -3.31*** 
209 /30372 = .00688 
Police (ctrl) -6% -0.48 
65/7261 = .00895 
Police (exper) -34% -4.94*** 
144 /23111 = .00623 
Non-police (exper) -18% -5.57*** 
1413/180588 = .00782 
3Significance tests are 1-tailed. For each comparison, the proportion of cases 
having disorder initiations is hypothesized to be smaller in the second group. 
Proportions were tested for equivalence after rounding to five decimal places. 
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Table 2. Minute-Based Crime Initiation Comparisons: Proportions of Minutes 
With Crime Initiations 
Group 1 Minutes 
Non-police (all) 
352/379622 = .00093 
Non-police (ctrl) 
228/199034 = .00115 
Non-police ( ctrl) 
228/199034 = .00115 
Non-police ( ctrl) 
228/199034 = .00115 
* significant at p < = .05 
* * significant at p < = .01 
* * * significant at p < = .001 
Group 2 Minutes 
Police (all) 
19 /30372 = .00063 
Police ( ctrl) 
7 /7261 = .00096 
Police (exper) 
12/23111 = .00052 
Non-police (exper) 
124/180588 = .00069 
Relative 
Difference Z score8 
-32% -1.67* 
-17% -0.47 
-55% -2.75* * 
-40% -4.64*** 
8Significance tests are 1-tailed. In each comparison, the proportion of cases 
having disorder initiations is hYpothesized to be smaller in the second group. 
Proportions were tested for eqmvalence after rounding to five decimal places. 
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Table 3 Lo N · g- ormal Survival Models (N 16,997) 
Models B Std Err Chi-square GrpN 
Model l 
In L = -5244.5 
drive-by .811 .342 5.622* 
duration .204 .102 4.005* 




ln L = -5240. 7 
stop 1-5 mins -.343 .173 3.947* 481 
stop 6-10 mins 
stop l l-15 mins 
.286 .268 1.135 279 
1.584 .619 6.548** 121 




"' . . 
"'*st~mficant at .05 level 
significant at .01 level 
For the. . . th 
I 
interested reader, the constant (am the equation on page 61) represents 
re e • og of the hazard rate. The scale term (c in the equation on page 61) 
lo P;esents p·' where pis a parameter affecting the scaling of the distribution of 
(l~B and, hence, the shape of the hazard rate. See Kalbfleisch and Prentice 
0). 
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_!able 4. Log-Normal Survival Estimates for Drive-bys and 11-15 Minute Stops 
Follow-Up Time Probability of Probability of 
Survival to Time T Survival to Time T 
- (Drive-bys) (11-15 Min. Stops) 
5 minutes .967 .995 
10 minutes .935 .988 
I 
15 minutes .906 .981 
I 
20 minutes .881 .973 
25 minutes .859 .966 






.!_able 5. Exponential Survival Models (N -16,997) 
Models - B Std Err Chi-square GrpN 
Model 1 
ln L = -5297.2 
drive-by .772 .290 7.066** 
duration .181 .092 3.894* 




ln L = -5294.2 
st0P 1-5 mins -.367 .147 6.190** 481 
st0P 6-10 mins .270 .260 1.078 279 
st0P 11-15 mins 1.575 .708 4.954* 121 
st0P 16-20 mins .085 .448 .036 66 
constant 5.078 
sca1e8 1.000 
: _si~nificant at .05 level 
significant at .01 level 





Ta?le 6. Percentages of Cases Across Dosage Categories Having Disorder 




































































v·, z·, o·, g·o g·o 1,-0 z·o 




















I I 0 C 
Q) N 
> I 2 I..... 
0 C 
I ·-I..... (l) 
0 
I t.O E -
(/) I-
Q) I Q_ > V) =::> I..... I Q. :J 0 I u +-' N 3: I V) 0 
0 C V) > I E J; 0 > LL 
I..... L!) I ::J I ..- Q) 
(f) I > OC) 
I ..- ·c ..- "'O 0 
N E II II 
0, I..... 
~ 0 





0 ;::, _J 
I >, 0 
~ 
0,.J :, 0 .c 
86"0 96 ' 0 t6 '0 z;5 ·0 06"0 88"0 98'0 t8 ·o l8·o 
t-
0, oo · l 
"' LL /\~!l!qDqOJd "' X 8W!l 0~ ID/\!I\Jns jO ::, <( 
l!) 
88 






















Mean Std Dev Min Max 
62. 73 6.98 46 83 
4452.65 495.07 3266 5893 
40.14 23.80 5 114 
194.98 99.01 39 528 
70.98 1.25 20 102 
0.64 1.60 0 35 
3.11 2.45 0 15 
3.95 8.25 1 76 
6.18 11.51 1 76 
15.33 16.27 1 71 
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Variable Experimental Control 
Hot Spots Hot Spots 
Observations 3135 3138 
50% 50% 
All Disorders 1798 2216 
44.8% 55.2% 
Crimes 153 265 
36.6% 63.4% 
Police Presences 9068 7929 
53.4% 46.6% 
Drive-bys 8505 7545 
53% 47% 
All stops 563 384 
59.5% 40.5% 
Stops 1-5 mins 262 219 
54.5% 45.5% 
Stops 6-10 mins 163 116 
58.4% 41.6% 
Stops 11-15 mins 88 33 
72.7% 27.3% 






I 0 4473 71.3 1 958 15.3 I 2 395 6.3 
I 3 170 2.7 
4 98 1.6 
5 57 .9 
6 37 .6 
7 27 .4 
8 11 .2 
9 14 .2 
10 6 .I 
II 7 .I 
12 5 .1 
13 3 .0 
14 2 .0 
15 3 .0 
16 1 .0 
I 
17 2 .0 
19 1 .0 
20 1 .0 
21 1 .0 




Disorder Type Number Observed 
Verbal Disorders 796 
Loud Disputes 204 
Drunk or Drugged Behavior 652 
Loud Noise/Music 1623 
Bag Persons 113 
Persons Down 38 
Solicitation 119 
Drug Activity 201 
Physical Assaults 62 
Auto Break-ins 4 
Building Break-ins 1 
Vandalism 35 
"Other" Disorders 255 
Unidentified Disorders 45 
* These counts do not sum to 4,014 because some instances of disorder involved 
more than one act. 
92 
--- -
Presences per Frequencies Percent 
Observation 
(all blocks) 
0 708 11.3 
1 1135 18.1 
2 1161 18.5 
3 998 15.9 
4 767 12.2 
5 525 8.4 
6 358 5.7 
7 249 4.0 
8 136 2.2 
9 111 1.8 
10 54 .9 
11 37 .6 
12 22 .4 
13 7 .1 
14 1 .0 
15 4 .1 
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SURVIVAL DATA SUMMARY 
Time in Number Disorder Censored 
Minutes At Risk 
1 16997 133 232 
2 16632 123 1654 
3 14855 122 1314 
4 13419 99 1094 
5 12226 130 1245 
6 10851 67 846 
7 9938 53 792 
8 9093 58 675 
9 8360 42 578 
10 7740 45 711 
11 6984 32 504 
12 6448 34 462 
13 5952 45 397 
14 5510 27 339 
15 5144 31 464 
16 4649 26 317 
17 4306 13 292 
18 4001 14 264 
19 3723 11 241 
20 3471 24 274 
21 3173 17 178 
22 2978 6 183 
23 2789 7 205 
24 2577 7 166 
25 2404 10 195 
26 2199 10 138 
27 2051 7 113 
28 1931 8 133 
29 1790 4 109 
30 1677 5 1672 
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Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Duration of Police 6.55 4.69 1 20 
Stops Used for 
Survival Analysis 
Time to Disorder 11.41 9.07 1 30 
or Censoring 
(all presences) 
Time to Disorder 11.40 9.07 1 30 
or Censoring 
(drive-bys) 
Time to Disorder 11.53 9.11 1 30 
or Censoring 
(all stops) 
Time to Disorder 11.10 8.94 1 30 
or Censoring 
(stops 1-5 mins) 
Time to Disorder 11.30 9.06 1 
30 
or Censoring 
(stops 6-10 mins) 
Time to Disorder 12.81 9.49 
1 30 
or Censoring 
(stops 11-15 mins) 
Time to Disorder 13.24 9.58 
1 30 
or Censoring 
(stops 16-20 mins) 
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I 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Potential 12.13 9.32 1 30 
Follow-Up 
(all presences) 
Potential 12.12 9.32 1 30 
Follow-Up 
(drive-bys) 




Potential 12.02 9.39 
1 30 
Follow-Up 
(stops 1-5 mins) 
Potential 12.03 
9.35 1 30 
Follow-Up 










(stops 16-20 mins) 
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APPENDIX B: OBSERVER CODEBOOK 
OODEEnJC FOR HOl'Sror OBSERVATION; 
POLICE PRESENCE AND STREET DISORDER 
Anne E. Beatty 
Joanne Oreskovich 
~ichael E, Buerger 
Compiled November 15, 1988 
Updated June 20, 1989 
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~,___--~---------------.......... ------
OODE EO]{: RJLICE PRESeJCE 
1. Date: The date of the observation in 6-digit code, month-day-
year, (February 21, 1989, is written 02-21-89 or 02/21/89), 
2 • Time. In: The time that the observer actually begins 
observation at the assigned hotspot (after parking, getting the 
checklist ready, etc. Use a standard 12-hour time, All 
~bs~rvations will be sometime between 6:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m., so 
1 t is not necessary to write "pn" or "am" in the space, 
3 - Tiae Cut: The time ( in 12-hour notation} that the observer 
completes the observation, prior to moving from the hotspot. 
Mote: It is vital that all observation times be recorded 
exactly. 00 Naf "fl.WE IT" -- If you are delayed, record the 
actual time you begin your observations. If you are late 
beginning, stay later at the encl, so that the observation period 
is always 70 minutes. 
Because we are doing random sampling, the time that the 
observation begins is less important than the length of the 
observation. However, because we must conduct random checks on 
Your presence at each spot, recording the actual time you are 
there is vital to the verification process, The verification 
process, in turn, is vital to the credibility of_ the project. 
If you are delayed for more than ten minutes, call the 
supervisor. 
4 • Hotspot #: This number will be entered on your sheets before 
!ou go out. Check your sheets before you go out, If the number 
is not there, ask the supervisor, 
5. ,..._ Code· On the first part of the line write the 
a. ~ver . . ed 
observer number that you have been assi~ ' digit number after 
b. Chlerver Sequence Code: Toe our · th h t If 
the dash should be filled in before you receive e s ee s. 
it is not, please ask the supervisor• 
. . t you were in (from the 
&. Pos.itian: Note wtuch parki~ sif you were not parked within 
numbered dots marked on the_ ~ps • mark a O, 
one car length of the identified spots, 
the supervisor to 
7 • Parallel Qded: Leave this blank for 
complete. (Note: 1 = yes; 2 = no,} 
th supervisor to complete. 
8 • Drive by: Leave this blank for e 
(~ote: 0 = drive-by not done; the drh"e-bYi 
1 = observer was present for fr the drive-by,} 
2 = observer was not present 0 
f the sheet, there are 
At the bottolD O the beginning and at the 
to be completed at 
Population Estimates: 
Population estimates 
enct of the shift. 
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Tiae:. . Record the time that you counted the cars. This should 
~ within five minutes of the beginning of the shift for the 
first estimates, and within five minutes the end of the shift for 
the second estimates. It is not necessary that these be done at 
the exact minute the shift begins and ends. 
a) ~ of People Cut-of-doors: Count the number of people who 
are visible out-of-doors within the hotspot boundaries and enter 
this number in the blank, Include people on porches. 
bJ Mlaber- of Parted cars: Count the nwnber of parked cars 
within the hotspot. Include any cars in parking lots if the 
parking lots are within the hotspot boundaries. Do not count 
cars in car dealer lots or used car lots. 
C) Nlaber of Stopped Cllrs! Count the number of cars that drive 
through the hotspot, in any direction, 
time period . 
within a fifteen second 
Sure i· tems 1 - 8 are filled in completely and ~ote: ~e l 
accurately and that the "police presence" sheet matches re event 
items with the "disorder" sheet for each hotspot observed. 
------------------------------------------------------------
poli' ce londl1Age for a marked police car. ,.\ Squad is ~inneapolis -~- t th . enn denotes only .the car, no e 
For our pur~ses, . the t For our purposes, any uniformed 
individual officers in the cars ,uad--'-nether Minneapolis Police, 
police officer in a ~ked ~ Sheriff's Department, State 
Park Police, University Poli~e,ban police department passing 
Patrol , Housing Patrol , or su ur 
through--counts as a squad, 
. f an unmarked car' they ~e cod~ 
If unifonned officers get out O t effect resides in their 
as Foot Officers. Since tbeir deterre;ked car you should record 
.:-==.:;.....:=.a.~-- and not in the unma ' 
visible w:uforms, and t the car's. 
the officers' presence, no 
ff" er who walks in the public 
A Foot Officer is any uniformed o i~ whether they arrive on foot 
t regardless O . uad gets out space of the hotspo , ff . er arrives in a sq ' . 
. d car If the o ic bu ' ldi· nd ( as though answering or in a squa · 1 · to a i •~ b · ld · " of th car and goes direct Y in 1•• but an "enters . ui ing 
e . . "foot petro the officer came 
a · call l' l t is not a h uld be recorded how . ed foot" 
below) It s o uacf' or ''arriv on 
~a tegory ( s_":e . the • "arrived in s~th the a.ppropr ia te activity' 
into your view, ecked along wi 
column should be ch is one foot patrol; only 
such as foot patrol. k together, it of the hotspot do you 
If two officers wal . d ' fferent areas 
if thev separately walk in l 
code t~o foot petrols, 
A squad and/or foot 
officer should 
al wavs be counted as 
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"present" when it is within the hotspot boundaries. It may also 
be counted as "present" if it is just outside of the boundaries, 
but within vision and may have a deterrent effect, To determine 
ambiguous squad information, the observer should ask the 
question, "if I were a mugger, would I be deterred by that 
officer or squad?" If the answer is yes, then record the 
presence; if no, don't record anything, 
OFFICIAL PRESENCE: 
11. Enters 
This column records the time you becaoe aware of a police 
car or a police officer on foot, or "Other Official Presence" 
(see below, #S 28-33), All observations of squad cars and 
officers on foot must have an entry in this column (the squad, 
not the number of officers in it, is the Wlit of analysis for 
mobile uni ts) , 
If an occupied squad is already in the hotspot when the 
observation period conmences, enter the "Time In" time in the 
"Enters" column, and check the appropriate Squad-Based Activity 
column to record its activity, Or, if an W1occupied squad is 
present when the observation period begins, enter the "Time In" 
time in the "Enters" column, and check the "Unoccupied Squad" 
coll.min, 
Connent: "Unoccupied Squad" ( see ~17 below) is a default 
category. It should be used only when you first arrive at a 
hotspot, and can see only the squad and not the officers. 
12. Lea"YeS 
This colUDIO records either the time that you observe a squad 
or foot patrol officer(sl or "other Official Presence" leave the 
boundaries of the Hot Spot, or ~Y point at which the squad or 
foot officer(s) leave your field of vision, There are two 
exceptions to this rule: 
a) If you see the officers enter a building within the 
Hotspot boundaries, begin a new "Activity Begins" entry (see #13, 
below) on the next line down, and check the "Enter Building" 
column on that line; 
bl If officers who arrived in a squad get out on foot, 
begin a new "Activity Begins" entry (see #13, below) on the. next 
1
.. down and check the "Foot Patrol'' column on that line, If 1ne , . 
th fficer~ then leave your field of vision but the squad is 
st~l~ in plain .. sight, mak~ a notat~on in the "Time Fnd~" (#16) 
l f or the Foot Patrol observation. We are assuming that co umn . . . bl h th uad will remain vis1 e event ough the officers are out of 
si:h:~ and the ef:,ect of ~e . squad wil~ be reflec~ in th~ 
duration of the Presenc~ times_- The ti~ the ~occupied squad 
is visible will /beLe re~ ect
1
ed 1n the tunes 1n the original 





If a squad drives into your field of vision, turns a corner 
and passes out of your sight, record a "Dri ve-1hrough" even if 
~~u soon see officers enter your vision on foot from the 
.1r~ction the squad went. Do not assume that they are the same 
obofficers, and/or that the squad car is ?trked within the hotspot 
,. undaries. Make a new "Presence:Enters" entry and check the 
Foot Patrol" column. 
If a squad and/or foot officer is still within the hotspot 
when the observation period ends, enter the ,.Time Q.rt" time in 
the "Leaves" column on the same line as the "Enters'' time. 
ll) kti vity RPgi DS 
As indicated above, this column is for recording specific 
activities (such as foot ?ttrol, citizen contacts, etc.) that 
occur while a squad or officer( s) is visible in the hotspot. The 
column will not always be used, 
Separate contacts may occur within an official presence; 
each should be given their o'"11 line of the checksheet, 
14 ) ktivi.ty Ibis 
This column records the end of each individual activity 
noted in #13 above, Record it on the same line as #13. 
1.::) ... lbnccupied Sqmd 
''Lhoccupied Squad" is a default category, It should be used 
.Qnly when you first arrive at a hotspot, and can see only the 
sguac1 and not the officers. , 
16 J ,._,__ 3 
~ · whe d This col1.11111 is used only for those t1me~ ~ a squa car 
.Passes through the hotspot with lights and/or. siren lnthuseh. 
It . ed t te •--'-en a squad arr1 ves at e otspot 1s nQt. us o no '"" •th· th bounda · 
with its lights and siren' and sto~ w1 in e th r 1euads. 
"Dr · ,. s either when you see e sg 
lea .1ve through the tiotspot,._~an the squad leaves your field of 
ve the hotspot ' or wuen 
""ision." 
l·n the ••connents" section of the line. Xote Code 3 arrivals 
l 7 J Drive-lhrongh bs rve a squad drive through the 
. Check this column when you O ; t haS 00 lights or siren in 
hotspot without stopping, when 
operation. "L es" times on the same 
Record both the "Enters" ~ eav 
line, even if thev are the same minute, 
18 J lLE ., ffic Law Enforcement. " · Here, 
. TLE is the police code for Tra ue.d pull another car over 
lt indicates any time that you sethe ~ 8;
0
1umn for any ticketing or 
Using lights and/or siren, Use is 
towing activity, 
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If the police arrest someone from the stopped car, indicate 
that activity on the next line, as a new activity. 
19 l Accident. 
If an accident occurs within the hotspot (or has occurred 
prior to your arrival), each squad that arrives at the scene 
should have a separate "Police Presence" entry, with a check in 
this colUJ1D'l. The main purpose of this is to track the number of 
squads in the hotspot at any given time, It is not necessacy 
for you to match the arrival and departure t ime of each squad. 
All that is necessary is to note arrivals and departures in 
order, 
20 J Stopped in Hotspot. 
This column applies to those times when a squad pulls in to 
the hotspot and the officer(s) inside remain(s) seated, possibly 
writing a report, or just monitoring the activity in the area. 
Check this column if, after seeing a squad pull in and park, 
you do not see the officers get out within a minute. The time of 
entry will be recorded in the "Police Presence: Enters" column 
(ill), and this column will be checked. 
If the officers subsequently begin a foot petrol after being 
in the car for a while, or go into a building, drop down a line 
and check the appropriate activity, noting the time in the 
"Activity Begins" column (#13). See Appendix A, Example #2, 
Foot-Based Activity 
The activities here are not listed in any particular order 
or priority; some or all activities can be done in sequence. 
''Foot Patrol" may include several "Citizen Contacts"; it may 
precede or follow "Enter Building," etc. 
21) Ardwd iD Squad 
Check this box if you see officers arrive in a DBrked squad, 
22 ) Arri !!4 cm Foot 
Check this box if you see officers enter the hotspot on 
foot, or if uniformed officers get out of an unmarked car . 
2 3 ) Foot Patrol 
This category should capture a deliberate walking tour of 
the hotspot by one or more officers. If you see no squad car, 
b t do observe an officer walking in the hotspot, check· this 
c~lumn and note the time in Column #11, "Presence: Enter," 
Do not check this coll.Dlln if a squad pulls up, the officers 
g t out ~ ilJIJleciiately enter a building, or make contact with a 
~ti en' on the street. Check the appropriate column, since it 
ci zrs that the police are there for the purpose of answering a appea ~ 
call or checking up on a person. 
2-t l linter: Bid Jdinff 
Check this column_wh~never the officers leave your field of 
. . by entering a bu1ld1ng. The entrance remains within your v1s1on 
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field of · · and· · l 
h 
v1s1on, 1n most cases you w1l be able to tell when 
t e officers leave. 
If a second car pulls up and the officers enter the 
building, too, begin a new "Presence" line, and check this column 
on that line. 
If an officer appears on foot and enters the building, make 
a new "Presence'' entry and check "Enters Building" and "Arrived 
on Foot" on the same line. For our purposes, it does not matter 
whether the police appear to be there on business, or on a meal 
or coffee break. See Appendix A, Example #3. 
25) Verbal Cit.:i.zen Qnt.act 
Begin a new "Activity" line and check this column whenever 
You see an officer or officers approach a citizen or group of 
citizens on the street, and no physical activity (such as a 
frisk, a shoving match, or an arrest) is observed, 
Comment: We will not al~ays be able to distinguish cordial from 
hostile contacts, especially at a distance, so we are using the 
broad categories only. 
Cotmient: The contact is the unit of analysis, not the number of 
Persons or officers involved in the contact. If a team of 
officers approach a single person or a group of people, count it 
as one contact. Splitting up two disputants, with one officer 
~lking with each party, is still a single contact •. Multiple 
Activity" entries should be made only when the officers very 
clearly split up and make contact with different and unassociated 
Persons on the street, or when the officers make contact with the 
same group at different times, 
COlllnent: If officers in a squad appear ~o have a verbal contact 
With c1· t · f th car ( 1· e the officers do not get out of 1zens rom e • • , ,, 
the squad), code the time as "Verbal Citizen Contact. 
26 l Plmrlcal Cituraa Omt.act. .. 
Any bet officers and c1 t1zens where you can contact ween f · k by the officers a 
observe physical contact -- a pat r1s ' 
sh · th f weapons regardless of whether the 
. o~1ng match, or e use o_ ~ -- should be checked as 
c1t1zen in question is taken 1nto cuSt Y 
a " · " line separate Activity Duration · . ting a gun at a person 
"Physical Contact" also i?cludes. ~::tick or flashlight. ' 
and tapping or prodding them wl th a nig · 
271 Arrest . I .11 be made will not always be Whether or not an arres~ is Wl f ou see the police pull up, 
clear to the observer at first • I ~ne into custody almost 
get out of the squad, and take s 
immediately, check only this co~~• contact of several minutes ► 
If the police make a citizen_n }landcuffs--or if there is 
duration, and then take_ someon~ away :imilar result--you may have 
a physical confrontation, wi~ ;ven though the arrest was the 
checked one or the other alre.adf tact the arrest should be 
l . t1zen con ' conclusion of a psrticu ar Cl 
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------- ----------
recorded on a senorate "Acti' vity" li' ne. The · dete · r-- time that you 
. ~ine ~hat an arrest has been made should end the preceding 
~tivity line, and begin a new activity line with this column 




squad that arrives at the scene should have a 
separate Arrest entry. See Appendix A, Ex.ample #4. 
28 J Security Guard 
If a uniformed private security guard is visible to you (and 
:~rd~ who work inside occasionally check the outside of their 
,,uildings), note the time that guard is visible on a separate 
Presence" line. 
The activities listed are for uniformed police only. If the 
official presence is a security guard, record only the "Enters" 
and "Leaves" time, and record in the "Conlnents" any activities 
the security guard may do. 
Note: ~innesota state law forbids security guards to wear 
blue, green, brown or maroon uniforms (police, Department of 
~tural Resources, Sheriff's Department, and State Patrol colors, 
respectively J. 
Off-duty police officers work as security at many cOIIJJlercial 
establishments, usually in unifonn. We are most concerned with 
the presence of the police, not with who is paying them. If you 
think the officer is working off-duty, record that observation in 
the "Comments" column but otherwise code that officer's presence 
and/or activities as if he or she were a foot patrol officer. 
29) Security Vehicle . . . 
Check this colt.mll'l if a marked security car (i.e., with roof 
lights and/or side markings) drives through the hotspot or is 
observed parked there , This category als~ includes pers<:>ns in 
uniform on scooters (funeral escorts), animal control vehicles, 
armored cars, meter monitors, etc. 
JO) Au-pd Fire Dept. )buiment · • parked in the 
If you see a fire engine (or fire chiefs car) 
hotspot, time its presence and check this column, 
30 Fire Dept. Driwe-t.hrol.llb fire engine drives through 
Check this column every time a 
the hotspot without stopping, 
32) Paded Allhdance 
If you see an ambulance parked 
Pr esence and check this column, 
in the hotspot, time its 
33) A•b11 lance Ori w-tllrouldl . ambulance drives through th~ 
Check this column every time an 
hotspot without stopping, 
Rescue truck on emergency ambulance 
Since Fire often sends a and the fire engine, eve if 
calls, please code both the ambulance 
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they're at the same place. 
l4)_~ InvolYea!Ut: 
This column indicates that the observer was involved, It 
should be checked on the same line with the activity in which the 
was observer was involved. ( For example, if the police have 
verbal citizen contact with you, record the time and check both 
the "Verbal citizen contact" column and the "Observer Inv," 
column on the same line. 
~'E: There should be only one check per line, with a couple of 
exceptions: 
a} If the first activity by an official presence is a foot-
based activity, then you must check either the "arrived in squad'' 
or the "arrived on foot" column as well as the appropriate 
activity column. 
bl If you are involved in an activity, you must check both 
th "Ob I " l e appropriate activity column and the server nv, co umn. 
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CODE 1nl(: DISORDER 
U .i.te: The date of the observation in 6-digit code, month-day-
Year, (February 21, 1989, would be written 02-21-89 or 02/21/89,. 
!~ Hotspot #: This number should be filled in when you pick up 
e sheets . If it is not, see a supervisor before you leave to 
make sure the maps you have are the appropriate ones. 
l) aise.. \/el" Code: Copy the number from the "Observer Sequence 
bo
Code " line on the corresponding "Police Presence" sheet. Include 
th Your three-digit observer number and the four digit sequence 
Code which has been filled in on the "Presence'' sheet. 
----------------------------------------~--------
5) ~t RPgioo 
This column records the time you become aware of an instance 
of crime or "disorder" comnensurate with one of the categories 
below, Write the time you arrived in this column if the activity 
was going on when your observation period began. 
6) Bw!llt &ds 
This column records the time that the incident under 
observation reaches a definite conclusion. Write the time your 
observation period ends in this column if the activity is still 
going on ~nen your observation period concludes. 
* !t'JIE: Rll MTA »rI1ff RRKfiiS, 'DIERE CAN IE A IMXDllf CF 'DllEE 
OtFtX.S PIR LIME °' 'DIE DI5CJfflliX <XIE SHEEI'. 
7 J .Inst.anbuw;-.a Bvmt ved . . t . l han 
Check th' l only if the obser activ1 Y is ess t is co umn ( .. ., bal 0 . rd " a minute in duration, A single loud sh?ut ver iso er.' 
#10 below) would merit 8 check in this column as wel~ as . in 
column #10; a motor vehicle driving thro~ ththe. arela withandits 
stereo blasting away would receive a check in is co umn a 
check • "Loud ,., . JU.... . " ( #20 below, . In these cases , the 
in "'oise, .,......,ic "Ev Be · " t · 
''Event Ends" time will be the same as the ent gins :uue. 
The times must be entered in both column~, 
S) Che Person . on in responsible for the 
Check this column if a single _pers 'ndle drunk staggering 
crime and disorder you observe (i,e,, a si ~ 
around, or sprawled on the sidewalk,• 
9) l\io or Jilre People son is involved. 
Check this column if more than one per 
lO > Vgrm! Disarder' when you hear instances of loud 
This column is to be checke<:-1d ed or otherwise, A drunk shouting, whether friendly, 1,ewi er ' 
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bewailing his or her fate to the four winds, and loud verbal 
harassment of ~ssing motorists belong in this category. 
11 J Loud ~ 
Loud threats and loud arguments between and among people 
should be coded as a "Loud Dispute" rather than a "Verbal 
Disorder. The level of aggressiveness and the degree of 
interaction displayed by two or more participants (either 
directly overheard, or obvious from facial expressions and/or 
body languageJ are the distinguishing criteria. For example, a 
person who follows another down the street at a distance, 
shouting and making threats from a safe distance and without 
getting a response (i.e., there appears to be no inininent or even 
likely confrontationJ should be coded for #10, Verbal Disorder. 
If the other person confronts him, "Verbal Disorder" should be 
ended, and a new line begun for "Loud Dispute." 
12J ~ ar .Qr,cged 
Check this column when you observe a person who is: 
--disoriented; . 
--lacking in coordination, i.e., stumbling, staggering, 
fumbling with car keys, hand-held packa~es, etc. 
--slurring his/her speech, or rambling speech to everyone or 
no one in ~rticular. 
13J Solicitatic:m . . 
This column indicates sexual solic1tat1on onlYi i~ should 
not be checked for solicitation of other p~ucts ofr servt1~test •. 
St 1 f dr · t a strong indicator o pros 1 u 10n 
activ ' ty e .,,,~ esl~ Po1sli: officers who have worked the Vice 1 Y • :"Jlnneapo is , · ange from the 
Squad advise that a female prostitutes 8ttire_may r t 
. . . . th f • shnet stockings- stereo ype to 
~ar1sh-makeup-and-min1sk1rt-w1 . 1 and th "co1J. .. ctiate look," 
Joog · · b · 1 SUl ts e --~ ~ 1ng su1ts, snowmo le ' 1 while male prostitutes Female prostitutes oft~n ~rkfa~'groups is a slow aimless 
work in groups. Character1st1c 0 
Walk confined to a li.mi ted area: a female prostitute generally 
The male custaner approaching' rs of the male prostitutes 
does not lmow the womani the cust~ used before ( though some 
have a preference for partners_ th~Y te that "I haven't seen you 
of the verbal exchanges may mdica ,, ) 
before'' or "I haven't used you before s • from the comer; female 
!iale prostitutes will wave to ~ stepping into the road, 
Prostitutes can be more aggress} tile oncoming car as though 
s_ometimes directly into the path O will be a short exchange at 
they are flagging down help, There. ther gets into the car or 
the car window, and the prostitute el 
returns to the sidewalk/corner, u recognize that the man or 
It ma...- take some time bef?re yo ual activity, For our 
• l . . t1 ... ct sex f . t . t . woman at the corner is so 1c1 •~ act·v·t ·s the rs m1nu e 
P " . " ti fo th1s d . urposes, the Be in _ ·~ t the Me o 
t hat ou f eel s ure ·ou know wu~ 
UJ ~ Actiritr similar behavior patt~rns, 
Drug activity is marked by verr 
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;i~e the "crack houses" of Minneapolis frequently employ 
w~odouts. The lookout, typically a male, may be visible in a 
in ow or on a rooftop. 
Sometimes the drug sales are blatant, and money and packets 
~ be observed changing hands. At other times, there will be a 
brief encounter with a contact person { usually from a car driving 
Y J I and the car will stop, the buyer enters a nearby house, and 
returns within two or three minutes, and drives off, 
At other times, the transaction will take place on the 
street: a third person will join the other two ( or the buyer 
alone}; the buyer and seller walk together a ways--sometimes 
around the block--and at some point money changes hands, at 
a~other, the drugs, The drug packet may be dropped on the 
sidewalk by the seller, and picked up by the buyer; shortly 
after, the two part company. 
As with prostitution, the "Begin" time for this activity is 
the first minute that you feel sure you Jmow what they are doing. 
15> PhYsica.l Assault 
This column applies to instances of pushing and shoving, or 
outright attack. rt may be accompanied by verbal disorder as 
well ( if so check both columns on the same line}• If the 
assault is 'accompanied by a robbery of some_ kind (i.e., taking 
something from the victim--wallet, purse, bicycle), check the 
''Other" column ( #22) and write "robbery" in the Coalnents column. 
16> ~ile Break-in . 
Check this column if you observe someone b~eak i~to an 
automobile, either by ji111DYing the locks or by_ sma~1ng ~ window. 
If the person then drives off with the car, write Possible Auto 
Theft" in the Ccmnents column, 
17) arildi'lf Break-in · 
Check this column if you observe someone forcing open a door 
or window of a building, Note in the CoarDen~s ~olumn whethe: the 
building is 
8 
residential or coamercial building, If possible, 
note the address at which this occurs, 
18J Vaod,,)j-
Check this coh.DJlll whenever 
deface, or destroy property. 
you observe someone damage, 
19) ~ · ---===--"'lb"".,..=~ emains down for longer than 15 
. A person who falls and r " That person may be drunk 
seconds is considered a "Person Down, ttacs call 911 fer an 
or ill. II you suspect • ~d •and a' person stays down 
aat-dance. If the weather is very co If you call 911 to report a 
f?r more than 5 minut~s, call 911 :dentifY yourself as a Hotspo; 
life-threatening situation, do_no.t iurself as a passing motorist, 
observer. If possible, identify yo 
and give the report anonymously, 
20) Loud MoiseAtlsic loud stereos, boom boxes, power 
Loud noise can include 
108 
tools loud . . lev 
1 
• revving motors, band practice, etc. Your tolerance 
of e . should be consistent among all of the hotspots, regardless 
neighborhood composition. 
21) Dag Per~ 
1 
The bag person is shabbily dressed, frequently with numerous 
fYer~ of clothing in all weather, carrying shopping bags or 
P astic lawn bags full of his/her belongings, often in carts or 
on bicycles. 
22)Qtber-
. We can't think of everything. You may see outright 
instances of pick-pocketing, of murder, rape, and other varied 
activities that might tempt Minneapolis property owners to move 
to and/or shop in the suburbs. Some possibilities include 
flashing, urinating in public, etc, If an activity offends your 
se~ibilities and doesn't fit any of the categories above, check 
thls colWDll and describe the activity in the C011111ellts column. 
2J) ~ Invol'ved 
This column indicates that the observer was involved. It 
should be checked on the same line with the activity in which the 
observer was involved, (For example, if there was a woman who 
8 PProached you with offers of sexual solicitation, record the 
time and check both the "Solicitation" column and the "Observer 
Inv•" collUll1l on the S8JTle line, 
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APPENDIX A 
By: Joanne Oreskovich 
CODING VINGEITES 
HOJ. would you code the following ambiguous situations? 
l. You are parked in your hotspot, a car pulls into your view 
and parks, about 5 minutes later a unifonued officer gets out 
of the car and enters the building. 
2. ~~ut halfway through your observation period, a truck leaves 
Its parking space and behind it you see an unoccupied sguad. 
3. 
4. 
A sguad is stopped in your view for about 2 minutes, with the 
engine running. An officer gets out and tickets a car, then 
gets back in the sguad and leaves. 
A squad pulls into the hotspot and parks for about one 
minute, Two officers get out of the car, one goes into the 
building, the other talks with a group of people on the 
sidewalk, After about five minutes the officer in the 
building comes out and talks with the same group of people 
and the other officer for a couple of minutes. The officers 
then get into the squad and leave. 






corner. About two minutes later two officers on foot walk 
from the squad's direction and patrol the streets. 
A squad cruises a parking lot going very slowly, stoOpping 
occasionally, but never parking, 
A squad with lights and siren on arrives in your hotspot and 
talks with/or aids accident victims, 
A foot tr l ff" tops a citizen and frisks and cuffs 
. pe o o icer s . About 5 minutes 
him over the course of about 5 minutes· . . 
later a squad pulls up with lights flash~.ng and the officer 
gets out and goes to the officer and detained person· All 
leave in the sguad about one minute lat er, 
A . through the hotspot, on two · 
van repeatedly drives talks with people on 
occasions, it stops and the passenger 
the street. 
. till8 on their porch front 
A group of young males ar7 sit ne enters the apartment, 
playing loud music, Occasion;llyf 
0
the others talk, shake 
comes back out, while a coupe 0 
hands, cajole with the motoriSt S· 
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